Cape Town clothing workers' attitudes towards key aspects of and alternatives to regulation by the Bargaining Council by Maraire, Wesley
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
  
University of Cape Town 
Faculty of Law 
 
 
Cape Town Clothing Workers’ Attitudes Towards Key Aspects of 
and Alternatives to Regulation by the Bargaining Council 
 
Wesley Maraire (MRRWES001) 
 
Supervisor: Dr Shane Godfrey 
 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of the Senate in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the Master of Philosophy degree in Labour Law in approved 
courses and a minor dissertation. The other part of the requirement for this 
qualification was the completion of a programme of courses. 
 
16 February 2015 
 
Word count: 26 145 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
i 
 
DECLARATION 
This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of 
any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, 
this dissertation from the work, or works of other people has been attributed, cited 
and referenced. I have used the Harvard convention method of referencing 
throughout the entire report.  
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the 
submission of Master of Philosophy dissertations, including those relating to length 
and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that this dissertation 
conforms to those regulations.  
 
Signature:                     Date: 16 February 2015 
  
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
All the glory be to God, the shepherd, who guided me through uncertain times during 
this research journey.  
Wellington and Ruramai Maraire, my beloved parents, who have supported me and 
are my biggest fans – thank you kindly.  
To my brothers and sisters who always have something positive to say and who 
coped with my constant whining when things were not going the way I planned, I 
give my utmost gratitude. Thanks also go to my friends, who gave me the motivation 
I needed whenever I was running out of steam. 
I am deeply indebted to the respondents who availed their time to talk to me when 
they were not under any obligation to do so. Thank you to the employers who 
allowed me into their factories to talk to their employees. 
To my supervisor Dr Shane Godfrey, thank you for your patience and for taking me 
on as your student from my Honours degree to this current project. Thank you for 
finding polite ways to dismiss some of my ridiculous ideas and allowing me the 
freedom to find and then express myself using my own voice. To Professor Jeremy 
Seekings and the Centre for Social Science Research that funded the project, thank 
you, firstly, for the money. Secondly, thank you for putting your faith in me, as it 
was not the norm to fund a first-year Master’s student. I trust the report is good 
enough to repay your faith in me. 
 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
The South African clothing industry has shed over 70 000 jobs in the last 
decade. This has given rise to huge debate in the industry and academia about the 
role of the bargaining council in regulating the industry as well as other factors such 
as trade liberalisation that are causing the industry to shrink. This study explores 
attitudes held by formal and informal clothing workers toward the regulatory 
environment and possible alternatives to current regulation by the bargaining 
council.  
The research aimed to explore worker understanding of the regulatory 
environment, in particular the wages versus job-security trade-off; to find out 
whether workers are aware of alternatives to the current wage model, such as 
performance-based incentive pay; to explore the attitudes workers hold toward 
home-based informal factories; and to assess the attitudes of workers to worker co-
operatives. Using semi- structured face-to-face interviews, 24 respondents (ten 
formal and 14 informal workers) were selected to participate in an attitude survey 
that explored their feelings across attitudinal classes – cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural, using the non-probability purposive sampling technique. 
Research findings show that both sets of workers generally had a very poor 
understanding of the industry’s regulatory environment. After receiving brief 
explanations of alternatives to regulation by the bargaining council, the workers 
understood them cognitively and attitudes varied between the two groups. All 
workers were generally against performance-based incentive pay because it requires 
them to place too much trust in employers. Informal work was viewed as a viable 
alternative although formal workers could not conceive joining informal firms.  
Both sets of workers expressed favour towards worker co-operatives, which 
have the advantage of changing the working relationship from manager and worker 
to worker as owner, thus empowering workers. All workers, however, demonstrated 
overall awareness of the pressures facing the clothing industry, such as those caused 
by cheap Chinese imports. The evidence is however, not sufficient to arrive at a set 
of conclusions regarding alternatives to regulation by the bargaining council. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 Background to the Study 
The clothing industry in South Africa has a long history and it remains an 
important source of employment due to its status as a labour-intensive sector. 
Nevertheless, the industry has been consistently shrinking for over a decade. 
Commentators and stakeholders hold varying views on the extent to which the 
industry is shedding jobs, with some arguing that more than 70 000 jobs have been 
lost in the past decade.1 At the beginning of 2002, there were 120 000 formal jobs in 
the industry; however, by 2011 there were only 52 400 jobs recorded.2 The Southern 
African Clothing & Textile Workers’ Union (from here on referred to as SACTWU) 
put a more positive spin on job losses. Noting that job losses have slowed- with the 
industry losing half as many jobs in 2011 as it had in 2010 and 64 per cent fewer jobs 
when compared to 2009- SACTWU concluded that the industry was recovering.3 
Despite efforts from both government as well as SACTWU to curb job 
losses, the industry remains vulnerable to retrenchments. Initiatives such as the tax 
break scheme of 2011, launched simultaneously with the wage agreement hailed as a 
hallmark by SACTWU and clothing firms that were party to the National Bargaining 
Council4 for Clothing Manufacturing (from hereafter referred to as the NBC) have 
failed to stop job cuts. 5 The wage agreement allowed employers to employ young 
and new workers at a reduced wage of 70 per cent of the normal wage, on the 
condition that factories could grow the number of jobs by 15 per cent. Nevertheless, 
the 700 compliant6 factories only created 350 jobs nationally, which led to the non-
renewal of the agreement. 
Subsequently, another wage scheme was introduced that allowed compliant 
factories to pay new workers 20 per cent less than the normal wage, although it 
                                                 
1 Heidi Vicentio, Investigating Growth Potential of the Clothing Industry and Identifying the 
Constrains of Growth (Cape Town: Mthente Research & Consulting Services, 2008), 7. 
2 Teigue Payne, “Clothing Industry Sheds Jobs,” Mail & Guardian, 17 February 2012, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-17-clothing-industry-sheds-jobs. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Organisation that is in theory, designed to be a joint venture between SACTWU and employer 
organisations. 
5 ‘The overarching collective bargaining body national agreements are set by the six employer 
organisations as well as SACTWU’ as prescribed in section 29 of the LRA (1995). 
6 Factories following and abiding by the bargaining council regulations, such as minimum wage. 
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included a compulsory productivity incentive that would allow workers to earn the 
full wage provided they met productivity targets. Both compliant and non-compliant7 
employers resisted this, as did workers who were unhappy about receiving less 
money when compared to their co-workers on the same production line. Employers 
faced the challenge of talented machinists outperforming their colleagues but only 
receiving the entry-level rate. The new employees soon demanded a wage increase or 
threatened to leave the factory, thereby proving failure of the wage model.   
There is a crux in the clothing industry due to the experienced job losses, 
which has led to huge debate within the industry and academia. In addition to the 
trade union view that the future looks bright for the industry, there are schools of 
thought that completely blame the bargaining council and current collective 
bargaining system for the job losses, due to its rigidity. Another school of thought 
believes the liberalisation policies that started under former South African President 
Thabo Mbeki and primarily the reduced trade tariffs have led to the shrinking of the 
industry as they allow cheap imports into the country. The key issue in the Cape 
Town clothing industry is job losses despite stagnant real wages over the years. This 
provided the premise for undertaking the exploratory study to find out the attitudes 
of the workers previously ignored, thereby filling an empirical gap in knowledge for 
both the industry and academia.  
1.1.1 Historical background and Trends in the clothing industry (South Africa 
and Cape Town) 
The South African clothing sector was almost non-existent in the 1920s,8 
with Johannesburg being the main area accommodating the industry and Cape Town 
the second largest.9 The workforce comprised mostly of coloured women (80 per 
cent of the workforce)10 in Cape Town and this trend continues today.11 Bennet 
reported that women comprised 86 per cent of the workforce nationally.12 The 
                                                 
7 Employers abstaining from set bargaining council collective agreements. 
8 Boladale Abiola, Knowledge, Technology and Growth (Washington D.C.: World Bank Institute, 
2006), 2. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Vicentio, Investigating Growth Potential of the Clothing Industry and Identifying the Constrains of 
Growth, 8. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Mark Bennet, Organising in the Informal Economy (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2003), 
10. 
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apartheid practice of limiting the employment of African workers to urban areas 
forced the industry to move to peripheral areas, leading Cape Town to become the 
single largest centre for the South African clothing sector.13 The most significant 
period in the Western Cape clothing sector was between 1950 and 1980 because it 
generated unprecedented employment (60 000 workers),14 as it benefitted from the 
National Party’s import-substitution policies.15 This would, however, change in 
contemporary times where import tariffs were reduced, and notably in 2002 the rand 
appreciated- making a very rapid and sustained surge in imports possible, which 
contributed to job losses because local firms could not compete. 16  
The clothing and textile industry is one of the largest economic sectors in the 
Western Cape and 37 per cent of all manufacturing workers are in Cape Town 
alone.17 The Province had more than 1 000 clothing firms by 2004 and 827 met the 
bargaining council compliance standards- Cape Town hosted 327of the compliant 
firms.18 Nevertheless, the number of bargaining council registered firms has reduced 
to 248 and only 150 firms comply with the bargaining council standards.  
SACTWU, in a bid to protect job cuts and factory closures has maintained 
caution regarding increased real wages over years, however, the industry has 
continued to shrink. There has been massive skills drainage in Cape Town because of 
retrenchments and resignations.19 Other factors contributing to the skills drainage are 
an ageing workforce not adequately replaced because youth look down on the 
sector.20 The Cosatu Regional General Secretary Tony Ehrenreigh was reported in 
the press in 2008 to have attested to rumours regarding workers not receiving their 
provident to account for ten per cent of resignations in the Western Cape. Rumours 
about the government freezing the workers’ money until they reached retirement age 
exacerbated the situation and Vicentio quotes Salie Semaar (Manager at Bonwit- a 
clothing firm in Cape Town) who agrees that these rumours have massively 
                                                 
13 Boladale, Knowledge, Technology and Growth, 2. 
14 Ibid., 3. 
15 Christi van der Westhuizen, Trade and Poverty, (Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and 
Development Research Unit, 2006), 4. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Vicentio, Investigating Growth Potential of the Clothing Industry and Identifying the Constrains of 
Growth, 8. 
18 Ibid, 9. 
19 Ibid, 10. 
20 Ibid, 11.  
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contributed to the natural attrition of the industry.21 Noteworthy are firms exiting the 
Western Cape economy firstly, in response to the availability of cheaper labour in 
other regions and countries. Secondly, Vicentio found that some employers complain 
that the South African legislative framework is too restrictive22 and this rigidity is 
highlighted further below.  
1.1.2 The industry 
The Cape Town clothing industry, and South Africa at large displays a 
dualistic structure, containing simultaneously both formal and informal forms of 
production.23 The growing number of retrenched workers has led to the 
informalisation of the clothing industry and the growth of home-based operations. 
The Clothing Federation of South Africa reported that the informal clothing industry 
engaged 60 000 workers in 199824 and the estimated 70 000 jobs lost in the last 
decade may have been absorbed by informal firms- bringing the number of informal 
workers to 130 000 presently. This informalisation trend is the reason why it was 
relevant to explore home-based informal firms as an alternative to the bargaining 
council regulated firms.  
Terms such as Cut, Make and Trim (CMT) and home-based work are 
synonymous within the industry to describe informal firms. The yardstick, however, 
between formal and informal in the clothing industry is registration with the 
bargaining council regardless of the size of the operation. In other words, a formal 
firm would be one registered with the bargaining council, whereas an informal firm 
would be one that should be registered with the council but is not (and presumably 
not complying with the wages and conditions stipulated in the bargaining council’s 
agreement).25  
The sewing machine dictates the structure of the clothing industry because, 
through its simplicity, longevity and relatively cheap cost, it facilitates entry into the 
                                                 
21 Ibid, 16.  
22 Ibid, 15.  
23 Christian M. Rogerson, “Successful SMEs in South Africa”, Development Southern Africa (01 July 
2010): 692. 
24 Clothing Federation of South Africa, Overview of the South African clothing industry, 
(Unpublished mimeographed report, Johannesburg, 1998), 1 
25 There are also firms that are registered with the bargaining council, meaning they are part of the 
formal (regulated) industry however do not comply with bargaining council collective agreements, 
which makes them non-compliant registered firms.  
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industry in the first place and therefore dominates it.26 The cost of the sewing 
machine makes it affordable to most, which is why there is a preponderance of small 
home-based operations in Cape Town. Cooklin (1991) found the same in the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in a 1971 survey, where 44 per cent of the 
total number of factories employed 25 people or less.27 The structure found by 
Cooklin in the EEC represents most parts of the world, and has remained consistent 
throughout; wherein two types of organisations, namely manufacturer or sub-
contractor, carry out production.28 The manufacturer is responsible for every stage in 
the production of garments and bears the cost of the expensive material such as cloth 
and associated production costs.29 The high cost of material needed to produce 
clothing limits the number of manufacturers and accounts for the emergence of sub-
contractors in South Africa.  
The role of a sub-contractor in the South African clothing industry can be further 
sub-divided into design houses, smaller factories, as well as home-based operations 
that may or may not be regulated by the bargaining council. The sub-contractor as an 
individual typically performs all the management and administrative functions30 and, 
like the Far East, South Africa has large factories employing more than 100 people 
that are sub-contracted, producing high volumes. Work is usually sub-contracted in 
five ways: 
i. Cutting: the manufacturer supplies cut garments, or raw materials and 
cutting markers. 
ii. Making-up: the most basic service offered by the sub-contractor. 
iii. Trimmings: the manufacturer may supply all the trimmings required for 
garments. 
iv. Finishing: pressing, final inspection and packaging, which may be done by 
either the manufacturer or the sub-contractor. 
v. Quality control: typically done by the manufacturer to ensure garments meet 
their specifications. 
                                                 
26 Gerry Cooklin, Introduction to Clothing Manufacture (Oxford: BSP Professional Books, 1991), 3. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 6. 
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1.1.3 The bargaining council 
The bargaining council is a forum designed for collective bargaining between 
registered trade unions and registered employer associations in order to settle matters 
of joint interest through negotiations.31 Section 28 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of  
1995 (LRA (1995)) lays out the functions of the bargaining council that include but 
are not limited to making and enforcing collective agreements,32 prevent and resolve 
labour disputes among other functions. Five bargaining councils namely; Northern 
Areas, Natal, Eastern Cape, Western Cape, Free State and Northern Cape regulate 
formally employed clothing workers.33  
The bargaining council has to register with the Department of Labour and any 
agreed conditions by it bind only the parties34 to the NBC who are parties to the 
collective agreement, subject to the provisions outlined in section 32 of the LRA 
(1995).35 Parties to the NBC engage in negotiations that typically culminate in a 
Main Collective Agreement covering wages and conditions of employment, 
including social benefits. Bargaining council agreements also address exclusively 
wage and conditions of employment for metro areas such as the Magisterial Districts 
of Bellville in the Western Cape Province and non-metro areas such as Newcastle in 
KwaZulu-Natal Province.  
The most critical feature of the collective bargaining system is enshrined in 
Section 32 of the LRA (1995).36 It prescribes that parties to the negotiations may ask 
the Minister of Labour in writing to extend a collective agreement concluded in the 
bargaining council to any non-parties37 that are within its registered 
scope/jurisdiction. Importantly, parties to the bargaining council have to be 
sufficiently representative.38 The Minister is obliged to extend the collective 
                                                 
31 Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995, s 28. 
32 A negotiated written agreement on workers’ terms and conditions of employment or matter of 
mutual interest.  
33 The five bargaining councils typically only have jurisdiction over major metropolitan areas and 
larger towns within certain provinces.  
34 Employers and employer organisations that are registered with the bargaining council and sign 
bargaining council agreements. 
35 Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995, s 31 
36 Ibid, s 32. 
37 Employers who do not or refuse to sign bargaining council agreements. Such employers may or 
may not belong to associations in the NBC or may not be registered with the bargaining council. 
38 A vague term interpreted to refer to parties having the majority of workers signed up as members to 
their organisation.  
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agreement to non-parties within 60 days of receiving the request by publishing a 
notice in the Government Gazette specifying the timeframe the collective agreement 
will be binding to non-parties.39 The Minister has to be satisfied by several 
conditions set out in section 32(3) before extending the collective agreement to non-
parties.40 It becomes illegal for any employer within the bargaining council scope to 
offer employees wages, working conditions and benefits that are less favourable than 
those set out in the extended collective agreement. Enterprises that wish to deviate 
from set minimum conditions are able to apply for and may be granted exemptions 
by the bargaining council. This mechanism of extending bargaining council 
collective agreement to non-parties has been utilised before in the South African 
clothing industry as will be discussed below.   
The 2012 to 2013 collective bargaining agreement was an innovation in the 
clothing industry and introduced the productivity incentive scheme that was extended 
to non-parties in April 2013. Previously, minimum wages were set without provision 
for workers to share in productivity increases. The extension was at the request of the 
bargaining council to the Minister of Labour in terms of section 32 of the LRA 
(1995).41 The agreement set out the minimum wage at R784 for a qualified machinist 
in the Western Cape and other metropolitan areas42 on the 0.5 per cent productivity 
incentive scheme, with new machinists earning R627 per week.43 The new entry rate 
provisions guarantee that all new employees earn 80 per cent of the normal gazetted 
rate, which is supplemented with an incentivised wage component that allows new 
employees to earn up to 100 per cent or more of the qualified rate.44 The agreement 
also protects employees from retrenchments where the employer intends to re-
employ the workers at the new entry rate in sub-clause 4.1. 
The constitution of the NBC lays out that the council is funded by levies raised 
through collective bargaining upon employers and employees who fall within its 
                                                 
39 Ibid., s32(2) 
40 Ibid., s32(3) 
41 Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995, s 32. 
42 Large cities with multiple jurisdictions and municipalities. 
43 National Bargaining Council (NBC) for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry, Extension to non-
parties of the National Main Collective Amending Agreement (Government Gazette, 12 April 2013), 
No 279. 
44 Ibid. 
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scope as well as fees from regional chambers’45 administration of social and related 
funds such as the provident fund. Deductions for benefit funds add considerably to 
labour costs, which strains employers and affects their ability to operate, thus cut 
costs through retrenchments. Additionally, these deductions reduce formal workers’ 
take home pay, which possibly leaves them worse off than informal workers, thereby 
making an exploratory attitude survey of workers’ thoughts and feelings towards the 
current wage model relevant.   
1.1.4 The rigidity of the collective bargaining system 
The LRA (1995) transformed industrial councils into bargaining councils that 
would facilitate the extension of collective agreements to non-parties.46 SACTWU 
drove moves to establish a NBC for the clothing manufacturing sector that would set 
minimum wages across the country, replacing the regional bargaining councils that 
did not cover the entire country.47 Although SACTWU negotiates a single wage deal 
for the country, inter-regional differentials exist and the various regions have 
authority to caucus and decide how to spread this over time, although with limited 
authority. The first closed shop agreement established in 2002 was extended to non-
parties in 2003. The Wage Board, which was replaced by the Employment 
Conditions Commission (ECC) increased wages beyond the jurisdiction of the 
bargaining council.  
The bargaining council retains potential rigidity because of the strong union 
voice and the fact that collective agreements may cover all employers in the same 
geographic area whether they like it or not, and regardless of whether they can afford 
it or not. The Minister of Labour has routinely extended collective agreements to 
cover all employers in South Africa. The NBC also confers unfettered authority to 
SACTWU to implement industrial action on any employer who fails to implement 
the terms of the collective agreement, whether they are party to the negotiations or 
not. This may be perceived as infringing on the employers’ freedom of association 
because participation on a bargaining council remains voluntary as the LRA (1995) 
removed the duty to bargain.  
                                                 
45 National Bargaining Council Constitution, 2010. 
46 Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995. 
47 Ibid., s29. 
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1.1.5 Escalating wages in recent years 
Nattrass and Seekings (2013) contend that both nominal and real minimum 
wages have increased in some regions since the first minimum wage agreement in 
2003.48 When the ECC, established in terms of section 59(1) of the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act 1997 (BCEA), was still setting the minimum wage in 2000, 
minimum wages in metro areas were double those of non-metro areas. By 2011, 
wages in non-metro areas such as Newcastle were two-thirds that of Cape Town.49 
This, according to Nattrass and Seekings (2013) can be attributed to the fact that the 
majority of employers represented in the NBC from metro areas are not affected 
heavily by the wage increases because they charge more to produce garments or are 
more productive and can therefore afford higher wages. However, this was proven 
fallible in the last decade because large factories like Seardel shed over 1 900 jobs in 
2011 and closed down several factories in South Africa, whilst opening and 
maintaining factories in Lesotho where it has a smaller wage bill. Seardel as well as 
other large and small factories shut down operations in Cape Town; as a result, 
thousands of workers lost their jobs.  
1.1.6 Impact of the Chinese imports 
There was very little incentive for South African retailers to import clothing 
in the 1960s due to the strict tariff barriers that protected the local clothing 
industry.50 In the 1990s tariffs were on average 90 per cent, which led retailers to 
source 93 per cent of their goods from local manufacturers.51 The result of import 
tariffs was a boost in employment. For example, the greater Durban area boasted 
approximately 450 clothing firms that employed between 45 000 and 49 000 workers 
and Cape Town had 60 000 workers.52 
The 1990s also marked the period when the South African government 
embarked on a shift in policy (reduced tariffs), aiming to re-engage with the global 
economic community. The government offered the WTO an eight-year tariff phase-
                                                 
48 Nattrass and Seekings, Job Destruction in the South African Clothing Industry (Johannesburg: The 
Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2013), 4. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Caroline Skinner and Imraan Valodia, “Labour Market Policy, and the Future of Labour Relations,” 
Transformation (2002): 58. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Boladale, Knowledge and Growth, 2.  
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down period for the clothing industry. The initial benefit was the lowered cost of 
imported material, which was soon outweighed by the fall of imported clothing.53 
Skinner and Valodia (2002) refer to tariff levels failing to portray a complete 
picture of the levels of import competition, especially in light of illegal imports that 
enter South Africa because of lax customs controls. 54 In 2001, for example, South 
African retailers imported between 45 per cent and 47 per cent of their goods. On the 
one hand, the reduction in locally sourced goods was a result of several factors, 
including China joining the WTO in 2001 and then rapidly expanding its export 
production.55 On the other hand, South African clothing manufacturers reneged on 
their contracts to local retailers when the rand depreciated, which forced retailers to 
look elsewhere, and China provided a cost-effective alternative.  
Nattrass and Seekings (2012) found that when the rand strengthened after 
2002, South African clothing exports fell, whilst imports rose despite a tariff level of 
45 per cent as well as the temporary restrictions on Chinese imports in 2007 and 
2008. 56 Clothing imports from China flooded the South African market and 
comprised 61 per cent of total clothing imports by 2008 and 74 per cent by 2010.57 
Noteworthy, the liberal policies did not only leave the clothing industry vulnerable to 
Chinese imports, but also crippled the industry to the extent that it could not compete 
with imports from neighbouring Lesotho that experienced a twenty-fold increase in 
exports to South Africa between 2006 and 2010. 
Local clothing manufacturers had to try and compete with imports in order to 
increase locally sourced goods from 53 per cent back to the 90 per cent experienced 
in the 1990s. It was this need to compete that put downward pressure on the price of 
clothing and this pressure, according to Skinner and Valodia (2002),58 negatively 
impacted on labour given that a high proportion (estimated at 30 per cent in 2001) of 
total inputs was remuneration.  
                                                 
53 Nattrass and Seekings, Differentiation with the South African Clothing Industry, 6. 
54 Skinner and Valodia, “Labour Market Policy, and the Future of Labour Relations,” 59. 
55 Nattrass and Seekings, Differentiation with the South African Clothing Industry, 7. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Skinner and Valodia, “Labour Market Policy, and the Future of Labour Relations,” 60. 
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1.1.7 Job losses in the industry 
The formal component of the clothing industry is governed by 
institutionalised bargaining council arrangements, and is largely concentrated in 
South Africa’s three largest metro areas.59 In the Western Cape, the majority of 
factories are located in the Cape Town metro area.60 Employment in the Western 
Cape declined by 2,9 per cent between 1990 and 1995, and by 4,9 per cent between 
1995 and 2001.61 In 2003, there were at least 283 formal establishments employing 
over 30,050 workers within the Province. However, in November 2013, 35 firms had 
closed down and only 125 factories were complying with the bargaining council. 
Furthermore, the 248 registered firms published by the NBC in 2013 were employing 
only 16 500 workers, a reduction from 23 416 recorded in 2010.62  
Effectively, the Cape Town clothing industry lost a conservative 13 000 jobs 
between 2003 and 2013 and there are signs of further job losses as factories continue 
to close. These numbers feed into the debate within the industry as well as academia, 
whereby Nattrass and Seekings (2013) blame the bargaining council, trade union and 
especially the Minister of Labour (for extending collective agreements to non-
parties) for the closure of clothing establishments and the loss of livelihood for 
workers. Godfrey, Clarke, Theron and Greenburg (2005) hold trade liberalisation 
policies and especially the reduction of import tariffs as the chief culprit for the 
shrinking of the industry.  
In order to mitigate the decline of the industry, employers have suggested 
performance-based incentive pay that they argue will maintain high productivity 
because the incentivised wage makes up the majority of the wage, whilst the base 
wage will only be a small component. On the other hand, workers have begun setting 
up unregulated home-based operations in response to retrenchments and low wages 
in the formal factories. As a third method, worker co-operatives were introduced to 
try and empower workers by changing the working relationship to workers as 
                                                 
59 Rogerson, “Successful SMEs in South Africa”. 
60 Bennet, “Organising in the Informal Economy”, 2. 
61 Mike Morris, Justin Barnes, Jeanne Esselaar, ‘An identification of strategic interventions at the 
Provincial Government level to secure the growth and development of the Western Cape Clothing and 
Textiles Industries’ Available from: 
http://www.westerncape.gov.za/other/2005/10/final_paper_most_updated_printing_clothing_and_text
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owners. These are all efforts aimed at finding flexibility in the clothing industry 
regulatory environment. The failure to find a complete solution to the shedding of 
jobs thus far presents room for this current study to explore four areas: 
i. Maintain the status quo as advocated by SACTWU and some employers, 
which may lead the industry to continue shedding jobs; 
ii. Fully implement the performance-based incentive pay suggested by some 
employers as a means to stay in business because production output is 
directly proportional to labour costs; 
iii. Facilitation of informal firms to accommodate retrenched workers through 
formal, regulated channels; and 
iv. Fully establish worker co-operatives in order to create future employment 
opportunities 
Having laid out the background and context of the research, chapter two will 
discuss each objective in more detail. 
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1.2 Summary of Chapters 
This first chapter contains an introduction to the study. It described the South 
African clothing industry collective bargaining structure, the bargaining council, and 
the collective agreements extended to non-parties both historically and in recent 
years. It laid the foundation and overall context of the Cape Town clothing industry 
in which the research study was undertaken. 
In the second chapter, related studies conducted by several researchers will be 
examined, revealing the nature of the clothing industry in Cape Town, South Africa, 
Africa, as well as in other continents in order to contextualise the current study. The 
chapter will be divided into different sections, with the first providing the objectives 
of the study. The second part discusses the trade-off between increased wages and 
job security. The third section addresses issues of performance-based incentive pay, 
whilst making use of international studies that reveal similar successful models. 
Fourth, the chapter will review research conducted on informal firms (mostly 
home-based), focusing on workers’ reasons for leaving formal employment. The 
workers were asked about the viability of home-based work as an alternative to the 
current bargaining council regulated system. Lastly, the chapter will outline work 
conducted on worker co-operatives, citing relevant legislation as well as case studies 
such as Mondragon in Spain where worker co-operatives have been successful and 
well documented. 
The third chapter provides a layout of the research design and methodology, 
including aspects such as methods of gathering and analysing data, the sampling 
framework, as well as limitations to the study. This chapter highlights the planning 
that took place to operationalise the study. 
A presentation and analysis of the findings based on the four focus areas is 
presented in the fourth chapter. The chapter provides answers to all the research 
questions, aims and objectives; outlining the attitudes held by clothing industry 
workers towards alternatives to bargaining council regulation as well as new findings 
that were not anticipated. Based on the research questions, the final chapter will offer 
conclusions. 
 
14 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 Introduction 
Previous enquiries into the clothing industry informed this research study.63 
Past enquiries have however been limited by their broad scope, as studies researched 
the entire manufacturing sector including footwear and textiles, therefore pertinent 
issues were glossed over such as the attitudes of Cape Town clothing workers who 
are affected the most by factory closures. Exploring workers’ attitudes toward 
regulation by the bargaining council fills an empirical knowledge gap, thereby 
providing a major contribution to the South African clothing industry as well as 
academia. 
2.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
2.2.1 Overall objectives 
The study was undertaken from a socio-legal perspective, which led to a 
range of policy questions regarding labour regulations and (more broadly) work. The 
focus of the research was on conducting an attitude survey around four areas, 
including the trade-off between increased wages and job security – one of the causes 
of factory closures and continued job losses. The second focus area was included in 
the study because some employers have suggested the industry should adopt 
performance-based incentive pay as an alternative to the flat rate wage that will keep 
them in business, and thus save jobs. The third area was included in the study due to 
the increasing number of retrenched workers who have taken up informal (mostly 
home-based) employment because they have few alternatives after retrenchment. The 
last focus area emerged from the worker co-operatives established in KwaZulu-Natal 
and the study sought to assess whether workers in Cape Town felt it was a viable 
alternative. 
2.2.2 Specific objectives 
i. The first objective was to find out if workers had knowledge of the regulatory 
environment, which would shed light on the type of relationship that exists 
between the regulatory bodies like SACTWU, the bargaining council, and the 
                                                 
63 Etienne Vlok; Shane Godfrey, et al; and Jeremy Seekings & Nicoli Nattrass. 
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workers. Ascertaining the level of workers’ understanding of the regulatory 
framework would also reveal if any of the resolutions established at the 
bargaining council reflect the demands/wishes of the workers. 
ii. The study sought to find out from formal and informal workers if they were 
aware of alternative wage models such as productivity-related pay. Such an 
inquiry demanded finding out if workers would welcome such developments 
in light of risks such as lower wages because bargaining council agreements 
would not cover them. It was important to look into productivity-related pay 
because employers have been pushing for such a model as a legitimate 
alternative to the current flat rate wage model. 
iii. The research explored the attitudes of the workers towards unregulated home-
based operations, analysing whether the workers felt such operations had 
benefits that outweighed the disadvantages associated with the formal 
factories. It also explored the relevance of SACTWU in the informal clothing 
industry and the role it could play. It was important to assess the informal 
sector because of the influx of retrenched workers who are out of options. 
iv. Lastly, the study assessed attitudes around the worker co-operatives; which 
change the employment relationship from manager and worker to worker as 
owner; thus giving labour decision-making powers in the workplace. This 
serves as a second worker option to regulation by the bargaining council. The 
background of this objective is built on the co-operatives in Durban, of which 
many have been reported in the press as bogus because previous employers 
are taking advantage of the loophole in the Co-operatives Act (2005) that 
does not define members as employees, thus are not covered by the LRA 
(1995).  
The four focus areas are discussed below and, while doing so, draw on studies 
covering similar topics. 
2.3 Trade-off between Increased Wages and Job Security 
The study surveyed worker attitudes towards South African labour standards 
and regulation of the clothing industry by the bargaining council. The chief aim was 
to map the best way to proceed in the industry from a worker perspective in order to 
save existing jobs and create employment opportunities. Nattrass (2001) in her study 
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of the Phuthaditjhaba case found that workers favoured having jobs ahead of higher 
wages. 64 It did not seem rational for workers to demand higher wages with the full 
knowledge that they could lose their jobs, 65 leading to questions of whether 
SACTWU was acting independently during bargaining council negotiations, 
uninformed by the workers. With this in mind, and no studies available, it was 
imperative to close the empirical knowledge gap in the Cape Town clothing industry.  
Nattrass and Seekings (2013) found that in Newcastle, where unemployment 
stood at 60 per cent, workers were willing to settle for less money if it meant keeping 
their jobs.66 Noteworthy, higher labour standards tend to make hiring unattractive, 
leading to unemployment and, in the case of the South African clothing industry, 
retrenchments and relocations have resulted in the loss of more than 70 000 jobs- 
with Cape Town accounting for 13 000 of jobs lost between 2003 and 2013.67  
Nattrass and Seekings (2013) hold the view that for ten years (2003-2013) 
SACTWU has used the NBC, and particularly Cape Town based employers, to 
impose high wages in non-metro areas.68 This is because these larger factories in 
metro areas benefit from capital subsidies under the DTI Industrial Policy Action 
Plan (IPAP), for example, Seardel (owned by SACTWU) received tax incentives 
worth R14.9 million in 2010, R37.7 million in 2011 and R46 million in 2012.69 
These larger factories also stand to benefit from the employment tax incentive70 
programme71 that was launched in 2014. Nonetheless, despite these capital subsidies, 
the big factories, including Seardel, had to close some of their factories in South 
Africa including Cape Town, while opening and maintaining those in low-wage 
countries such as Lesotho. What is evident is the clear trade-off that exists between 
increasing wages and job losses, especially in the context of cheap imports that are 
gaining market share. It was imperative to investigate how the people affected most 
                                                 
64 Nicoli Nattrass, Wage Strategies and Minimum Wages in Decentralised Regions (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001), 874. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Nattrass and Seekings, Job Destruction in the South African Clothing Industry. 
67 Vicentio, Investigating Growth Potential of the Clothing Industry and Identifying the Constrains of 
Growth, 7. 
68 Nattrass and Seekings, Job Destruction in the South African Clothing Industry, 3. 
69 Payne, “Clothing Industry Sheds Jobs”. 
70 Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Employment Tax Incentive Bill, 2013. 
71 The ETI is an incentive aimed at encouraging employers to hire young and less experienced work 
seekers. It was implemented with effect from 1 January 2014. Read more at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/TaxTypes/PAYE/Pages/Employment-Tax-Incentive.aspx. 
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by the decisions made at the bargaining council feel about this trade-off and the 
possibility of adopting other alternatives that may save their jobs. 
2.4 Performance-Based Incentive Pay 
Godfrey and Theron (2012) found that the industry is in crisis, having the 
lowest wages in the manufacturing sector, and shrinking at an alarming rate.72 The 
extended collective agreement presently in effect (2014) increased the minimum 
weekly wage to R784 for qualified machinists in Cape Town. Approximately 500 
factories nationally and 150 in Cape Town have disregarded collective agreements 
reached by unions and some employer organisations at the bargaining council aimed 
to drive up wages. Some employers have relocated to low-cost labour areas because 
of the compliance drive by the bargaining council and the courts. There is thus a 
tightly knit relationship between employment and labour laws.  
From the standpoint of workers, it might be fiscally responsible to adopt the 
performance-based incentive pay that will consequently boost productivity and raise 
wages. Godfrey, et al. (2005) found that manufacturers in South Africa have 
suggested a similar pay system that ensures the larger proportion of the wage was 
incentivised, whilst the minimum wage remained in place as a smaller proportion of 
the wage.73 
Performance-based incentive pay is used around the world (China, New 
Zealand, Malawi and Mauritius) and it is possible for it to work in South Africa. 
Billikopf (2004) attested to individual incentive plans offering the clearest link 
between the workers’ effort and the reward.74 Billikopf’s work spanned over two 
decades and concluded that the piecework system is the best-known individual 
incentive pay plan.75 Although his work was primarily in agriculture, he noted that 
the principles could easily be adapted to other types of work. 
There are sharp lessons to be learnt from Mauritius and Malawi that unlike 
South Africa allow the piece rate system, which is similar to performance-based 
incentive pay that some of the South African manufacturers have suggested. These 
                                                 
72 Godfrey and Theron, The Crisis in Clothing. 
73 Godfrey, et al., “On the Outskirts but still in Fashion,” Development and Labour Monograph, 
(2005): 7. 
74 Gregorio Billikopf, Designing an Effective Piece Rate, (USA: University of California, 2004), 1. 
75 Ibid. 
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neighbouring countries have seen major growth in their clothing industries, in turn 
are supplying the South African clothing market that is in steep decline. Mauritius, 
for example, is now the second largest clothing exporter to South Africa after 
China.76 In order to keep employers within South African borders and avoid 
migration to neighbouring countries, policy makers need to pay attention to 
alternatives that may be adopted for the South African clothing industry. 
Rogerson (2010) identified low productivity as the crux of the weakness of 
the South African clothing industry.77 Findings by Billikopf (2004) point to the 
possible effectiveness of a new performance-based incentive pay system in South 
Africa that motivates individual workers while increasing productivity. For 
performance-based incentive pay to work well, it requires trust and confidence on the 
part of the workers that their interests are protected.78 For Billikopf, employers can 
reduce costs while increasing productivity, allowing workers to earn substantially 
greater amounts.79 
Rogerson (2010) holds the view that static strategies like labour displacement 
and initiatives that emphasise reducing labour costs through relocating production 
facilities from metro areas to peripheral labour markets with cheaper wages, and 
even outside of South Africa are not effective.80 The relocation of production 
facilities is a static strategy because it offers only a short-term respite to competitive 
pressures because firms that depend on low wages must constantly relocate 
production with all its attendant costs.81 Costs associated with relocating production 
remove the seemingly permanent cost advantage usually enjoyed by firms in low 
wage areas. In addition, relocation of firms adversely affects entire societies where 
the firms were located through job losses. This indicates a need for useful 
alternatives to simultaneously improve production and wages. 
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2.5 Informal Home-Based Operations  
Homeworking is not an easy concept to define. These authors82 define it as: 
‘[Homeworking] involves an employment relationship and in the case of the owner of 
the enterprise, involves a relationship of economic dependence on a supplier or 
intermediary that is akin to an employment relationship’ 
Godfrey, et al. (2005) confirmed that there is very little research conducted on 
homeworking in South Africa.83 However, as noted above, regulation with the 
bargaining council is the key to differentiating between formal and informal clothing 
establishments in South Africa. 
The crisis in the clothing industry has caused the rise of home-based operations 
across South Africa. These are typically informal factories employing less than six 
employees on short-term contract.84 Homeworking operations with more than six 
employees are obliged to register with the Clothing Bargaining Council (CBC) and 
bound by collective agreements.85 However, even those with more than six 
employees are difficult to police. This is, firstly, because it is very difficult to find 
their place of work. Secondly, due to the precarious nature of informal employment, 
it is common practice for employers to call workers only when needed, depending on 
the size of the order – meaning workers do not work on a daily basis. The majority of 
these home-based operations are nonetheless unregulated by the laws governing the 
clothing industry and do not abide by the terms of collective agreements, which 
makes them illegal. 
For Godfrey, et al. (2005), non-compliance with the bargaining council 
agreements usually means poor working conditions and job insecurity.86 Godfrey, et 
al., found that workers held negative attitudes towards prospects in the formal 
clothing industry87 and noted that, ‘Although the views of the workers on the union 
varied, the general tone of their comments was often very negative’.88 Many of the 
31 workers interviewed in both Cape Town and Durban in 2002 by the authors held 
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83 Godfrey, et al., Development and Labour Monograph, 7. 
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the union partly or fully responsible for their current situation.89 Furthermore, they 
blamed the union for retrenchments, the poor financial situation and the current 
vulnerability within the clothing industry.90 
Vicentio (2008) found that a significant portion of workers resigned from factory 
jobs in pursuit of homeworking opportunities that they viewed as a better 
alternative.91 Some workers opted to work for themselves or for a small business in 
their neighbourhood instead of at a regulated factory that offers numerous employee 
benefits. Both owners of home-based operations and workers have said that it is 
more attractive to work at an informal firm because they do not have to comply with 
bargaining council regulations.92 For example, they have the potential to earn more 
in the informal sector because they do not have to pay the SACTWU membership 
levy, among other deductions, nor do they have to pay exorbitant transport costs due 
to the proximity of their employers’ residence and place of work.93 The absence of 
these additional expenses and deductions has the potential to allow informal workers 
to have a better take-home pay. 
As previously mentioned, alongside the formal clothing industry the informal 
production of clothing across the major urban centres of South Africa has been 
increasing.94 Sub-contractors are predominantly home-based firms that mostly 
receive already cut material to make garments.95 Clothing industry participants 
typically refer to home-based operations as Cut, Make and Trim (CMT), which is 
another form of sub-contractor that is normally registered with the bargaining 
council, meaning that its activities comply with the set standards. The commercial 
contract is the key mechanism that enables formal enterprises to effectively employ 
homeworkers but avoid the obligations of employers in terms of labour regulations.96 
Godfrey, et al. (2005) noted that home-based work is not a result of an individual 
choice and problems associated with it far outweigh any positive aspects.97 The 
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majority of workers they interviewed said they became homeworkers after 
retrenchment because of the closure of a factory.98 
2.6 Worker Co-operatives 
There are five basic types of co-operatives, namely consumer/supplier co-
operatives, savings and credit co-operatives, marketing/producer co-operatives, 
service co-operatives and, lastly, worker co-operatives.99 This study focuses on the 
worker co-operative, which is a primary co-operative whose main aim is to provide 
employment to its members.100 In such an enterprise, workers have complete control 
over their working environment and the members are worker-owners.101 
Noteworthy are the co-operative values and international principles that have 
remained consistent through time, regardless of geographical location. The most 
successful known worker co-operative is Mondragon in Spain, and its founding 
fathers laid down the values adopted by the South African Co-operatives Act of 
2005. These are the values of self-help, self-reliance, self-responsibility, democracy, 
equality and social responsibility.102 Further, Ramadiro, Mavundla and Seohatse 
(2003) found that the recent interest in co-operatives or common ownership amongst 
poor and unemployed people in South Africa is a direct and often spontaneous 
response to unemployment.103 
The Co-operatives Act of 2005104 was in fulfilment of the Department of 
Trade and Industry’s (DTI) quest to ensure a dynamic industrial, globally 
competitive South African economy. The main objective was inclusive growth and 
development as well as decent employment and equity. The statute was designed to 
promote and regulate co-operatives in South Africa. However, a gap has emerged 
since the traditional way of employment has become inadequate because it relies on 
the employment relationship as the focus of protective labour legislation. This is seen 
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in the way worker co-operatives are not protected in the LRA (1995). The 
amendment to the Act has not been implemented in two years despite having been 
sent to the office of the President of South Africa Jacob Zuma in 2012.  
SACTWU has accused private consultants of helping clothing employers to 
evade labour laws by masquerading as worker co-operatives and subsequently 
avoiding the bargaining council agreements, which gains the force of the law in 
terms of the LRA (1995).105 Amendments to the Co-operatives Act will limit the 
exemption of worker co-operatives excluded in terms of the LRA (1995) to worker 
co-operatives with fewer than 50 members.106 A loophole remains even after the 
amendments have been enacted in that bogus worker co-operatives can be 
established by CMTs that split operations into two or more worker co-operatives 
with fewer members. 
Worker co-operatives have succeeded elsewhere (e.g. Mondragon and 
Zimbabwe agricultural sector) and it is worth exploring the possibility of such 
successes in the South African context. The DTI has been pouring money into 
worker co-operatives and using them as a planned programme for job creation across 
many industries. Ramadiro, et al. (2003) found that the National Union of 
Mineworkers of South Africa also began promoting worker co-operatives in the early 
1990s to address retrenchments.107 This all speaks to the potential success of worker 
co-operatives as a tool in South Africa to respond to high unemployment in the 
clothing industry, in particular through employing retrenched workers. 
In Zimbabwe there has not been a lot written on co-operatives, however the 
government has used them with some success to mobilise the population and capital 
and to increase agricultural productivity. In South Africa, worker co-operatives have 
been seen as agents of economic development, with the African National Congress 
Youth League (ANCYL) arguing that worker co-operatives materialise the notion of 
bottom-up development.108 Other commentators see the sector as making it possible 
to envision small businesses outside of conventional small and medium enterprises 
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(SMEs), providing an alternative income-generation stream.109 Workers at a co-
operative that has existed from 2011 prefer a low wage that is 75 per cent of the 
bargaining council minimum wage.110 Nattrass and Seekings as well as other 
scholars in line with this argument propound that a low wage is better than no wage. 
Payne (2012) found that worker co-operatives theoretically have potential to 
compete with regular companies and save many jobs.111 Historically, worker co-
operatives have not been very successful because they were inwardly focussed on the 
needs of their members instead of focussing on customers and competition.112 Payne 
quotes Ramamurti, the director of the Centre for Emerging Markets at Northeastern 
University in the United States of America, who argues that there is an enhanced risk 
of failure if the worker co-operatives are governed democratically and members have 
to vote on major issues.113 
2.7 Chapter Overview 
In summary, this chapter discussed the objectives of the research. 
Importantly, it detailed the four key areas of the study, firstly examining the current 
system where SACTWU demands higher wages, which some employers cannot pay 
resulting in the bargaining council using the courts to shut them down. The chapter 
then outlined three alternatives to this model with the first being performance-based 
incentive pay that clothing employers argue will raise wages while improving the 
employers’ competitiveness. The second key area was homeworking, a worker 
alternative that is mostly a spontaneous reaction to retrenchments. Lastly, the chapter 
addressed the worker co-operatives, intended to upgrade workers from a subordinate 
and manager relationship to worker as owner. 
The following chapter provides a layout of the research design and the 
methods used to gather and analyse data. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the research design used to fulfil the objectives of the 
research and address the research topic. The section also discusses the methodology 
followed when conducting the research, which includes the sampling technique, 
interviewing, as well as the ethical considerations that guided the study. This section 
also pays attention to the limitations of the study, both from a design perspective as 
well as personal reflections based on the research journey. Lastly, an overview is 
given of the chapter. 
3.2 Research Plan 
The study is exploratory, and focuses on the attitudes of workers in the 
clothing industry in Cape Town. Two sets of employees (formal and informal 
workers) form part of the respondent groups and are discussed as separate subjects, 
except in instances when they share similar attitudes. Babbie (1989) identifies three 
purposes of social science research, namely exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory.114 The study is of a socio-legal nature because is it researching human 
subjects, and is exploratory because the attitudes of workers in the clothing industry 
have not been explored. Neuman (2006) and Babbie (1989) agree that such a study is 
essential when problems are in preliminary stages, and there is very little 
understanding of the issue.115 The focus herein, was to formulate precise questions 
that may be answered by future research, and there was no expectation to yield 
definitive results. 
The research is use-inspired or applied because it provides practical or 
empirical findings, whereas pure research is informed by theoretical paradigms, 
which provide a foundation for knowledge and understanding. Nevertheless, these 
two research paradigms overlap because pure research in the human relations field 
                                                 
114 Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Science Research, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989). 
115 Babbie, The Practice of Social Science Research, 1989; William L. Neuman, Social Research 
Methods (Boston: Pearson/Allyn and Bacon, 2006), 33. 
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has practical implications, and conversely, applied research often has implications 
for knowledge development.116 
As alluded to in the sections above, one limitation of the available literature is 
workers’ views on the status of the industry are neglected. This study aimed to be a 
medium for the workers’ unexpressed attitudes towards the legislative framework 
governing their industry. This made qualitative research ideal because it places 
emphasis on respondents through in-depth interviews, allowing them to share their 
lived realities. 
A sample of 24 workers was considered an ideal amount for in-depth interviews 
as it was thought to produce sufficiently manageable data. This is because the 
research did not seek representativity, and instead sought to explore the attitudes 
workers hold towards the current system of collective bargaining. Research, with the 
purpose of exploring feelings/attitudes in a complex real situation, does the 
following.117 
i. Provides a thick description 
ii. Establishes a firm understanding of the actor’s attitude 
iii. Has a process orientation 
iv. Has a relative lack of control 
v. Should be inside-centred 
vi. Should be inductive 
An exploratory study was considered appropriate in order to develop a practical 
understanding of the field as a means to then design and execute a second, more 
extensive study.118 Conducting an exploratory study was also advantageous because 
of the qualitative techniques for gathering data, and the fact that the research was less 
wedded to a specific theory. The study is founded on four initial research questions: 
i. Do workers understand the system of collective bargaining and trade-off that 
exists between regularly negotiated wages and job security? 
ii. Are workers aware of alternatives to bargaining council regulation and 
current wage model?  
                                                 
116 A. S. De Vos, Research at Grass Roots, (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 2002), 109. 
117 Ran Greenstein, Benjamin Roberts and Ari Sitas, Research Methods Training Manual, 2003. 
http://www.academia.edu/3198713/Research_Methods_Training_Manual, 49-53. 
118 Neuman, Social Research Methods, 33. 
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iii. Do workers see homeworking as a viable alternative to formal factories? 
iv. Do workers perceive worker co-operatives to be a feasible alternative to 
formal employment? 
3.3 Research Methodology 
3.3.1 Qualitative versus quantitative 
The study could have opted for a quantitative method through a survey 
questionnaire, as this would have produced findings that are more representative. 
However, the nature of the questions dictated a qualitative approach because the 
questions required at least a one-page explanation of concepts, such as performance-
based incentive pay, before the workers were able to answer them. Furthermore, all 
four-focus areas needed explanations in case workers were not aware of them. This 
research followed a socio-legal framework and, although it addressed issues on 
minimum wages and productivity-related wages, both quantitatively measurable 
things, the real focus of the research was the four focus areas that required 
explanations that could only be achieved through interviews. A questionnaire would 
not have been able to provide informed answers and reflect the understanding and 
attitudes of the workers towards regulation by the bargaining council. 
Qualitative research aims to look at something historically and 
comprehensively, to study it in its complexity, and to understand it in its context.119 
For example, the questions started from the respondents’ working history and 
continued up to their current state, exploring their plans and revealing their feelings 
about each subject in the process. A quantitative study is reductionist in its approach 
according to the study of behaviour; therefore, such a method would have lost sight 
of the whole picture.120 This is because it oversimplifies social reality in its stress for 
measurement, and it is not context-free.121 This research was placed in the context of 
the existing interface between attitudes held by the workers towards the clothing 
industry legislative framework. A qualitative study enabled the research to reveal the 
full picture or ‘thick’ description of the situation facing workers in the clothing 
                                                 
119 Keith F. Punch, Introduction to Research Methods in Education (London: Sage Publications, 
2005), 186. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
27 
 
industry. Such flexibility allowed the researcher to include observations from the site 
and other asides. 
3.3.2 Sampling framework 
The research was conducted in the Cape Town Metropolis, and comprised of 
workers in formal and informal firms. The pre-sampling process meant that the 
researcher had to decide on the appropriate respondents to interview. Both sets of 
respondents were selected via a non-probability purposive sampling framework. ‘A 
purposive sample is comprised of features that contain the most representative or typical 
attribute of the population’.122 
Consent to conduct the study was obtained from the owners of the formal and 
informal factories as well as from the workers. The owners and workers were 
provided with supporting documents such as the approach letter from the supervisor 
(refer to Appendix C) and the consent form prior to the interview. 
The process of making initial contact and gaining access to participants has 
the potential to affect all stages of the interviewer-interviewee relationship and with 
that the quality, reliability and validity of interview data.123 In light of this 
realisation, due attention was paid to approaching the formal employers through the 
existing list of compliant firms124 on the bargaining council website. When 
approaching employers, and then respondents for data collection, the approach was 
both ethical and professional.125 
Factory owners were given explanations about the criteria for choosing 
respondents and they gave suggestions on those that were more comfortable 
speaking English. In every case where a respondent was selected to participate, they 
were given a brief explanation about the study and asked to volunteer and then sign 
the consent form. In most cases, the respondents were given the consent form in the 
days prior to the interview to allow them to read it over for a better understanding. 
                                                 
122 De Vos, Research at Grass Roots, 207. 
123 Punch, Introduction to Research Methods in Education, 174. 
124 Factories that abide by the collective agreements reached at the bargaining council, such as the 
minimum wage. The employers follow the regulations in terms of the LRA (1995), amongst other 
legislation. 
125 Punch, Introduction to Research Methods in Education, 186. 
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The research targeted respondents that were currently employed by formal 
factories (regulated) or had prior working experience in the formal clothing factories. 
The workers were required to have worked in a bargaining council-regulated 
environment for at least one year prior to the time of the interview. Twenty-five 
respondents with a prior history in the formal clothing industry were interviewed (i.e. 
ten formal workers and 14 informal workers – as one respondent withdrew). The 
respondents were chosen regardless of age and race; however males were preferred 
in some factories because they were not represented in the initial sample. The only 
other criterion for selection was willingness to share their experiences and feelings. 
The research is exploratory in nature, and this made snowballing appropriate 
for sampling informal workers because they are very difficult to locate ordinarily 
since there is no database for home-based factories. Several respondents suggested 
homeworking operations that they felt would be relevant and willing to participate in 
the study, and these were approached. The process was relatively simple and cost-
efficient. 
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Table 1: Profile of respondents – formal workers 
Age Gender Race Occupation 
No. of years 
in industry 
Retrenched 
Date of 
interview 
46 Female  Coloured 
Quality 
controller 
20 Once 28/01/2014 
36 Female  Coloured Sorter 14 N/A 12/12/2013 
53 Female  African Ironer 25 Once  11/12/2013 
N/A Female  Coloured N/A 5 
Factory 
closure 
29/01/2014 
34 Female  Coloured 
Dispatch 
packer 
15 N/A 13/02/2014 
N/A Female  Coloured Time study 17 N/A 17/02/2014 
N/A Male Coloured Cutter 6 N/A 03/02/2014 
N/A Male Coloured 
Machine 
mechanic 
13 N/A 09/12/2013 
37 Male African Machinist 
6 in South 
Africa. 17 
including 
Malawi 
Voluntary  18/02/2014 
N/A Male Coloured Machinist  5 N/A 30/01/2014 
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Table 2: Profile of respondents – informal home-based workers 
Age Gender Race Occupation 
No. of 
years in 
industry 
No. of 
years in 
informal 
factory 
Date of 
interview 
35 Female Coloured Machinist 10 1 20/03/2014 
47 Female Coloured N/A 35 2 14/10/2013 
59 Female Coloured Machinist 32 12 01/10/2013 
53 Female Coloured Machinist 20+ N/A 01/10/2013 
56 Female Coloured Machinist 39 18 01/10/2013 
50 Female Coloured Machinist 30 N/A 01/10/2013 
53 Female Coloured Machinist 30 6 months 27/08/2014 
42 Female Coloured Machinist 15 5 08/08/2013 
50 Female Coloured 
Sample 
machinist 
17 N/A 08/08/2013 
58 Female Coloured Ironer 14 6 08/08/2013 
54 Female Coloured Machinist 20 N/A 25/07/2013 
35 Female African Ironer 1.5 N/A 25/07/2013 
33 Female African Machinist 8 5 25/07/2013 
N/A Female Coloured Machinist N/A N/A 08/08/2013 
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3.4 Methods of Gathering Data 
3.4.1 Face-to-face interviews 
Punch (2005) believes that interviews have the ability to access people’s 
feelings, meanings, and definitions of situations as well as construction of reality.126 
Noteworthy, an interview is the most powerful way of understanding others. As 
Jones says: 
In order to understand other persons’ construction of reality, we do well to ask 
them…and to ask them in such a way that they can tell us in their terms (rather than 
those imposed rigidly and a priori by ourselves) and in a depth, which addresses the 
rich context that is the substance of their meanings.127 
Initial interview questions were general, semi-structured and open-ended, 
which started the interview and kept it moving forward.128 The wording of each 
question depended on the direction of the specific interview and emerged as the 
interviews unfolded.129 Interviews are a flexible data-collection tool, and it is 
because of this ability to adapt to a wide variety of research situations that it was the 
appropriate tool for this exploratory study, which sought to survey the attitudes of 
workers without imposing a prior classification that would have otherwise limited 
the field of inquiry. 
The interviews were recorded digitally with a voice recorder (dictaphone) 
after the participants gave their consent. A back-up device (smartphone) was also 
utilised. The interviews were approximately 30 minutes long instead of the planned 
60 minutes as lunchtime in the industry is only half an hour. This presented a 
challenge, as the focus areas required a longer interview time in order to carefully go 
through the research questions for each focus area. As a result of the time constrains, 
some research questions were prioritised over others. 
3.4.2 Attitude survey 
Prominent social psychology authors Eagly and Shelly (1998) define ‘attitude’ as 
‘a psychological tendency expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some 
                                                 
126 Punch, Introduction to Research Methods in Education, 168. 
127 Sue Jones, Depth Interviewing, (Aldershot, 1985), 46. 
128 Punch, Introduction to Research Methods in Education, 170. 
129 Ibid. 
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degree of favour or disfavour’.130 Responses elicited by attitude objects have been 
described as belonging to three classes: 
i. Cognitive category: contains thoughts and brings about understanding and 
evaluation of the issues 
ii. Affective category: consists of feelings or emotions – gives rise to favour or 
disfavour on the issues 
iii. Behavioural category: encompasses actions and intentions to act 
These thoughts, feelings and behaviours are all directed at the entity that is the 
object of the attitude, and provide a convenient language for describing attitudinal 
phenomena.131 It is important to note that attitudes do not necessarily have all three 
aspects, either at the point of their formation or at the point of attitudinal 
responding.132 This research, following Eagly and Shelly (1998), defined an attitude 
survey as an evaluation of a person’s feelings towards their environment. For this 
research, the object of the attitude was the clothing industry regulatory environment, 
including bodies such as SACTWU, the bargaining council, as well as employers. A 
face-to-face interview is the most efficient way of conducting such an evaluation 
because it is conducive for identifying emotions exhibited by respondents towards 
the objects of their attitudes. 
The three attitudinal classes were used to measure the attitudes of the workers 
towards the key focus areas of the study. For example, the behavioural category was 
a yardstick for measuring the prospects of workers acting on the feelings or thoughts 
they held towards a particular focus area. The questions that were asked spanned all 
three attitudinal classes. The questions ranged from inquiring about the overall 
worker awareness and understanding of the four focus areas, to assessing the degree 
of favour or disfavour the workers had for each of the areas. Lastly, the questions 
addressed future plans the workers had in light of the state of the clothing industry, 
as well as suggestions on the route the industry should take in order to stop job losses 
through factory closures and to create more employment. 
                                                 
130 Alice Eagly and Shelly Chaiken, Attitude Structure and Function, (Oxford University Press, 1998), 
269. 
131 Ibid., 271. 
132 Ibid. 
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3.4.3 Feminist approach 
The clothing industry is a female-dominated sector and Cape Town is no 
exception.133 For this reason, the research took on a feminist-based interview 
approach:  
The feminist perspective sees the traditional interviewing as a masculine paradigm, 
stressing masculine traits and excluding sensitivity, emotionality and other traits 
culturally viewed as feminine.134 
This study was best suited to feminist interviewing because it required 
openness, emotional engagement and the development of trust, instead of the 
scientific positivity that requires objectivity and detachment.135 Workers in the 
clothing industry are real people and the issues explored by the research go to the 
core of their livelihoods and so utmost sensitivity was necessary. It was initially 
difficult for the researcher to develop the level of emotional intelligence required, 
despite practicing. However, after three interviews it became easier to relate to, and 
empathise with, the workers. The result was that respondents who at first appeared 
shy or intimidated became increasingly relaxed and were thus more forthcoming 
with how they felt regarding any of the focus areas, depending on how well they 
understood the issue. 
The research aimed to rid the study of the traditional hierarchical relationship 
between interviewer and interviewee because minimising status differences enables a 
greater range of responses and, therefore, richer data. Sensitivity and minimising 
status differences helped overcome impeding factors such as the researcher being a 
Zimbabwean, English-speaking male who was researching predominantly Afrikaans 
and/or Xhosa-speaking females. The interviewer and the respondents were, therefore, 
co-equals, effectively reducing the chances of the researcher manipulating data, and 
exerting undue influence when reporting. Despite efforts to seamlessly apply the 
feminist approach, there was one respondent who withdrew from the interview 
because she felt intimidated by the line of questioning and did not think she could 
adequately answer the questions. 
                                                 
133 Etienne Vlok, The Textile and Clothing Industry in South Africa, 227. 
134 Punch, Introduction to Research Methods in Education, 172-173. 
135 Ibid. 
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3.5 Data Analysis Strategy 
All the interviews were transcribed (ten by the researcher and fourteen by a 
professional transcriber who signed a non-disclosure agreement). This analysis 
followed open coding, which required the reading of transcripts several times. The 
interviews were topically focussed according to the four focus areas and every 
respondent in a respondent group was asked the same questions, which meant the 
themes, categories and sub-themes that emerged were aligned with the main research 
objectives. The information gathered from each respondent was then compared with 
similar answers from the similar respondent group and subsequently analysed. 
3.5.1 Ethical considerations 
In addition to the law faculty policy on research involving human subjects, 
De Vos (2002)136 and Babbie (1989)137 heavily influenced the ethical considerations 
that guided the process of the study. An ethical approach is imperative because 
qualitative research is inherently subjective due to personal involvement, and cannot 
be observed through experiments. However, due attention was paid to elements of 
bias, which effectively reduced subjectivity. 
3.5.2 Consent 
Consent was sought from the owners of the factories through an initial phone 
call, which was followed by a physical visit to the factory and a letter containing the 
purpose of the study. Once permission was granted to conduct the study, informed 
consent was sought from the individual respondents. In addition to the consent form, 
at the beginning of each interview the researcher reinforced that participation was 
voluntary and that respondents could withdraw at any point if they felt 
uncomfortable, without experiencing any consequences (one respondent requested to 
withdraw and her interview was not used for the study). 
3.5.3 Anonymity 
The professional transcriber signed a non-disclosure agreement that protected 
the names of all the respondents, owners, and names of factories or homeworking 
operations. The interviewees’ details were kept anonymous so that their real 
                                                 
136 De Vos, Research at Grass Roots, 62-63. 
137 Babbie, The Practice of Social Science Research, 62-69. 
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identities would not be compromised. The respondents are not referred to by their 
names in the study. The organisations’ names have also been kept anonymous in 
order to protect their identities. 
3.6 Limitations of the Study 
3.6.1 Limitations of the design and methodology 
The interpretation of data collected through qualitative methods is based on 
one’s interpretation of the participants’ words and actions. Qualitative research is 
therefore inherently subjective and/or biased because it is sometimes based on 
misunderstood or misinterpreted information or gestures from the interviewer to the 
respondent and/or vice versa. 
Although open and flexible research strategies were followed, Babbie and 
Mouton (2001) point out that one of the pitfalls of an exploratory study is that it 
seldom produces satisfactory answers due to its subjective nature that contains 
bias.138 In order to mitigate bias, sampling was dictated by the objective to 
understand the diversity of opinions and experiences among formal and informal 
workers. In terms of analysing the data, an objective system of open coding that 
required the reading of transcripts several times was used, which did not leave room 
for prioritising some attitudes ahead of others. 
The research journey was a humbling experience, and the first lesson learnt 
was that things often do not go according to plan in research and a plan can amount 
to a mere guideline. It was difficult to accept that a dissertation follows its own 
course as more than twenty formal employers were contacted and only three were 
responsive at one point. The interviews were planned for an hour; however, these 
had to be cut down to 20-30 minutes in order to be accommodated by the 
respondents’ lunch time. This meant that some questions had to be cut out of the 
interview schedule and the concept explanations had to be shortened, which may 
have impacted on the workers’ understanding of the four key areas – ultimately 
affecting worker attitudes, since the level of understanding of a particular 
phenomenon and evaluation informs feelings towards the object of the attitude. 
                                                 
138 Earl Babbie and Johann Mouton, The Practice of Social Science Research, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 80. 
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3.6.2 Limitations of the sample 
The informants were not diverse enough to get a holistic picture of the state 
of the clothing industry because only workers (formal and informal) were 
interviewed. It would have been beneficial to survey employers of the same workers 
who were interviewed, union representatives, the DTI, as well as the Ministry of 
Labour in order to cross check the information gathered. A survey of these 
stakeholders could have been undertaken using in-depth face-to-face interviews, 
because it would have produced richer data as interviews would feed off of the 
qualitative research strengths. Surveying all stakeholders would have provided an 
end-to-end understanding and analysis of the industry, which is essential for coming 
up with alternatives to the current dysfunctional system that is shedding jobs. 
It was, nevertheless, impossible to interview all the stakeholders because of 
time constrains. This study is in part fulfilment of a Master’s degree with a 
coursework component that needed to be completed in four academic semesters. 
Such deadlines made it unrealistic to generate a larger, more diverse sample size. 
Additionally, there were budget constrains because the research funding was not 
enough for a longer study. Further research should be conducted with the other 
stakeholders if a viable alternative to the current system of collective bargaining that 
has caused job losses is to be found and successfully implemented in South Africa. 
It was anticipated that the majority of workers in the clothing industry in 
Cape Town would be coloured females; however, the impact of a male non-
Afrikaans researcher was underestimated. This was, nevertheless, moderated by the 
feminist approach adopted in the research study (e.g. the researcher made sure to sit 
on a chair that was lower than the respondent, and dressed down). 
3.7 Reflections on the Study 
The study presented an opportunity to practically implement the academic 
knowledge amassed by the researcher over the previous six years and combine it 
with lived realities of the workers in the clothing industry. The research journey 
provided a useful learning curve that honed research skills and provided a good 
platform to further academic pursuits, while cementing a strong conviction for use-
inspired research. Through the study lessons were learnt about research techniques, 
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such as the feminist approach, which helped the researcher to understand the nature 
of research; ultimately allowing for a better understanding of the clothing industry. 
3.8 Chapter Overview 
This section discussed the research design, laying out the research plan as 
well as the methodology that guided the research process, which included the 
sampling framework, data-collection technique and strategy for analysing the data 
gathered. The section delineated on the ethical considerations, limitations to the 
study, as well as some personal reflections of the researcher on the research journey. 
The following chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the findings from the interview 
responses, especially those aligned with the four focus areas of the study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.1 Introduction 
This section offers an analysis of the research findings in response to the 
main research objectives. The findings were analysed by reading the interview 
transcripts several times in order to make the relevant connections in line with the 
research objectives. The respondent groups were divided into formal and informal 
workers and their attitudes were analysed separately, except in instances where they 
shared similar sentiments. From the outset, some misconceptions were expected from 
workers about some of the focus areas; however, there was greater ignorance 
regarding the current wage structure and system of collective bargaining, to such an 
extent that they appeared to confuse the union and the bargaining council. 
4.1.1 Number of years in the clothing industry 
It is important to note the number of years respondents have worked in the 
clothing industry because it provides a contextual basis for the information they 
share. The number of years was also a screening mechanism during the sampling 
process because the starting hypothesis139 was that longer serving workers have a 
greater knowledge and understanding of the industry and thus may be in a better 
position to share their feelings. There were ten respondents with more than 20 years 
experience, the youngest was 33 and the oldest was 58 years old. The age and 
number of years in the industry speaks to the skills drainage challenge in the Cape 
Town clothing industry because the bulk of the workers are approaching retirement 
age and are not adequately replaced with younger people. This helps explain 
additional factors perpetuating the decline of the industry. Vicentio (2008) found that 
the industry was in distress in Cape Town due to the skills gap left by retiring 
workers and the youth consider themselves ‘too fancy’ to work in the clothing 
industry, whereas historically youth followed their parents’ footsteps.140 
 
                                                 
139 The starting hypothesis was based on the fact that workers who have worked in the clothing 
industry for longer than 10-15 years are in a position to understand the changes that have occurred 
during the transition from the Industrial Conciliation Act (1956) and Industrial Councils to the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 and bargaining councils. 
140 Vicentio, Investigating Growth Potential of the Clothing Industry and Identifying the Constrains of 
Growth, 11. 
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Table 3: Number of years in the clothing industry 
Years 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21+ 
Formal 2 1 3 1 3 
Informal 1 2 2 1 7 
 
Two things emerged across the respondent groups, as explored below. Firstly, 
the longer-serving workers were divided into two, as one group had a good 
understanding of the industry and its history and the other group failed to remember 
how the industry functioned under the Industrial Conciliation Act (1956) and 
Industrial Councils more than 15 years ago.  
4.1.2 Race and gender 
Between the respondent groups, there were only four males who were 
employed at formal factories. The attitudes of the workers were generally uniform 
across the variables of race and gender, both of which did not seem to in any way 
influence the way in which different workers felt about the four focus areas. The 
majority of respondents were coloured females.  
4.2 Understanding of the Regulatory Framework 
The 24 workers interviewed (ten formal and 14 informal) were aware of the 
existence or had heard of SACTWU, which they referred to as ‘the office in Salt 
River’. The workers possibly refer to SACTWU in this manner because it is housed 
in the Cape Town suburb of Salt River, in the same building as the bargaining 
council, which may account for the seeming confusion regarding the purpose and 
functions of the organisations.  
Table 4: Understanding of the regulatory framework 
Level No knowledge Poor knowledge Good understanding 
Formal 6 2 2 
Informal 11 3 0 
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Both worker groups had a remarkably poor understanding of the bargaining 
council and its purpose in the clothing industry. The majority of workers interviewed 
seemed to lack a clear understanding of the difference between the trade union and 
the bargaining council and appeared to confuse the functions of the two. The 
following quotation captures how the workers thought the union operated relative to 
the bargaining council, ‘The union is mostly where we had a sick fund and we had a 
provident fund. And if you had complaints with your supervisor, it was there you can 
complain….’ It appears the workers were talking about the bargaining council instead 
of the union. Although they were not aware of it, the bargaining council rather than 
SACTWU manages the provident fund. On the other hand, SACTWU is the only 
worker party on the bargaining council, so it also makes sense that workers would 
take disputes regarding the provident fund to the union for assistance whenever they 
encountered problems. 
The main findings from both groups of workers are discussed separately 
below in order to showcase their attitudes towards the clothing industry regulatory 
environment.  
4.2.1 Formal workers 
4.2.1.1 Level of understanding of the regulatory environment 
All ten formal respondents were aware of the existence of SACTWU and the 
bargaining council however, understood very little about the functions of these 
organisations. Four formal workers demonstrated knowledge of, and understanding, 
of the purpose/function of each body. 
Two of the ten workers complained that, ‘[SACTWU] promise a lot when they 
come here, but when you go there, they tell you to go to that floor and that floor tell you I 
can’t help you, go back to that floor….’ One of the possible reasons for such criticism is 
that workers may end up accidentally taking queries to the wrong office the first time 
because the two bodies are housed in the same building in Salt River. Since the 
workers are not fully aware of the different functions the two bodies fulfil, they are 
bound to be frustrated and, thus, hold negative attitudes towards both. Workers do 
not have a deep understanding of the regulatory environment, and this partly or 
wholly shapes their attitudes towards the governing bodies; meaning their cognitive 
attitude is formed from this lack of understanding. The poor understanding of the 
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regulatory environment may also influence the affective category and ultimately the 
behavioural category that leads to apathy and general removal from union activities. 
On the other hand, in addition to confusing them with those of the union, 
some of the workers could not articulate the bargaining council functions, ‘I don’t 
really know what goes on at the bargaining council….’ This goes to show the general 
ignorance of the workers towards the regulatory environment. For almost all of the 
eight workers who had either no knowledge or a poor understanding of the 
regulatory framework, the interview presented the first time they were hearing about 
the bargaining council. The union is responsible for educating workers on the 
framework that governs their industry and deducts fees from their wages. From this 
standpoint, SACTWU may be seen as failing to fulfil its mandate and should 
champion programmes that acquaint workers with the functions of the regulatory 
bodies, which would then enable the workers to differentiate between bargaining 
council matters like the provident fund and union-related matters like dispute 
resolution. A good understanding of the regulatory framework is useful to workers as 
they can better utilise the services offered by each of the two bodies. 
The fact that some of the workers interviewed did not have knowledge of the 
regulatory framework as well as the functions of the bodies that regulate that 
environment suggests a poor relationship between SACTWU and its members. The 
trade-union mandate is to represent its members’ interests and central to this is the 
education of workers about their industry so that they are in a position to make 
informed decisions on issues such as wage demands or industrial action. The poor 
understanding exhibited by the workers brings further questions as to whether the 
union’s fights for increased wages is really informed by the workers and represents 
their interests. It was out of the scope of this exploratory study however, it presents 
an opportunity for further studies that investigate worker understanding of the 
current and previous collective agreements and the amount of input they had in the 
negotiated agreements.  
4.2.1.2 Formal workers: attitudes towards SACTWU 
From the outset, it is important to note that six of the ten formal workers 
interviewed did not have a clear understanding of the union functions. Of the four 
that demonstrated an understanding of SACTWU’s purpose, only two could 
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articulate these functions in detail. These differences in level of understanding may 
have affected the respondents’ responses. Nevertheless, feelings towards the union 
were consistent among the respondents. The majority of workers felt that SACTWU 
was too aligned to the employers, and thus did not represent their own core interests. 
One respondent lamented the way union representatives regularly met with the 
employers at the factory more often than they met with the workers themselves. This 
respondent shared sentiments that are representative of the collective: ‘There is a lot of 
good workers here but they don’t want to talk, you know why? Because every time the union 
people come here, they go to the bosses. They don’t confront us with how we feel, how is the 
work, is your moneys right?’ This respondent seemed to allude to workers being 
intimidated by the regular meetings between union representatives and the 
employers, to the extent that they feared expressing their opinions on critical issues 
such as wages and other conditions of work. It was not clear, however, whether 
workers were certain it was a trade union official that visited the factory because it 
could have been a bargaining council official coming to check the wage books for 
example and did not meet with workers after finding everything in order. 
The findings echo Buhlungu (2010) in his interpretation of the changing 
nature of union leadership that projected images of an elevated social status through 
inter alia smart dress code and moving in the same social circle as [factory] 
managers.141 One respondent had this to say, ‘I don’t think they have my best interests at 
heart man, because if they get their full salary at the end of the month, they are happy, but 
what about us? Because from my point of view, we are working for their salaries, you see 
what I mean, it’s the truth my bru….’   
A few of the formal workers were convinced the union was fulfilling its 
mandate and said, ‘At the moment they are doing what they are supposed to do but as 
workers sometimes feel they can do more, they are supposed to do more…’ These workers 
felt that the union was championing their interests however, they felt there was room 
to do more for the betterment of workers.  
                                                 
141 Sakhela Buhlungu, ‘A Paradox of Victory: COSATU and the Democratic Transformation in South 
Africa’, (South Africa: KwaZulu- Natal Press, 2010), 117-118.  
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4.2.1.3 Formal workers: attitudes to accepting a lower wage versus factory closure 
The majority of formal workers interviewed expressed that they would not 
take a lower wage even if it meant losing their jobs. Three respondents said that they 
would accept a pay cut in order to avoid retrenchment for operational requirements 
and of those none would accept anything beyond a R100 reduction. ‘I would never 
take a lower wage…cost of living is already expensive, how can I go lower?’ In as much as 
workers could not exactly describe the regulatory framework, functions of the union 
and bargaining council, they demonstrated a good sense of the socio-economic 
challenges within South Africa. The Cape Town workers’ attitude to lower wages 
diverge from what Nattrass and Seekings (2013) found in Newcastle where there is 
60 per cent unemployment and workers are willing to accept a low wage over no 
wage at all.142 The divergent findings may be explained by the fact that cost of living 
is higher in metro areas than non-metro areas and workers in metro-areas have more 
job options and can migrate to other sectors. 
The refusal to accept lower wages in order to avoid job losses may be taken 
as sufficient justification of the union effort to demand higher wages. Nevertheless, 
the sticking point is the lack of information given to workers, evident in their poor 
understanding of the regulatory environment and system of collective bargaining, 
which leads to questions about the type of relationship between SACTWU and its 
members. It is then possible that SACTWU may not be completely transparent to 
workers about the consequences of higher labour standards employers cannot meet. 
The number of jobs lost in Cape Town, factories closed and the 150 non-compliant 
firms as well as the findings of this study render Kalula, et al.’s (2008) sentiments 
plausible that labour institutions lack the capacity to do the job assigned to them by 
law, as the bargaining council does not seem to fully resolve matters of mutual 
interest among the parties.143 
4.2.1.4 Formal workers: attitude to possessing power over their wages 
The workers do not feel as though they have power over their wages; they 
feel the wages are imposed on them and are not a result of a collaborative effort 
between the workers and SACTWU. The workers felt that they were not involved in 
                                                 
142 Nattrass and Seekings, Job Destruction in the South African Clothing Industry. 
143 Kalula, Ordor and Fenwick, Labour Law Reforms that Support Decent Work, 1. 
44 
 
decisions regarding the amount they were paid because no one asked them how 
much money they wanted to receive as weekly wages. The relationship between 
SACTWU and the workers once again seems to be one in which workers lack the 
necessary information so that they can make informed decisions regarding wages. 
However, the more informed formal workers commented that they had 
control over their wages. Their view was that their demands and interests inform the 
union efforts. There was consistency in the attitudes among formal workers who 
understood the functions of the union and could distinguish between the functions of 
the union and those of the bargaining council. The following quote sums up how the 
more informed workers felt, ‘I have control over how much I get paid … I know what an 
ironer is supposed to get paid now and I get more than the bargaining council wage here…’ 
The respondent did not want to share how much money she received weekly and this 
made it difficult to compare with the gazetted bargaining council wage. The workers 
may have confused the meaning of ‘control over wages’ to mean earning more 
money, and this was a methodological limitation of the interviews. Nevertheless, 
these workers were a minority as the majority of workers were not well informed 
about the union functions and could not adequately answer the question. 
Having laid this foundation, the following sections pay attention to the 
possible alternatives to the current wage model and regulation by the bargaining 
council. 
4.3 Wages Versus Job Security Trade-Off 
4.3.1 Formal workers: attitudes towards factory closures 
The majority of formal workers primarily blamed employers for factory 
closures and gave very little to no blame to SACTWU. Formal workers felt that the 
employers had cheated them and in turn blamed them for closing factories, for two 
reasons: either to pay off debt or avoid paying out their salaries among other 
benefits. The sentiments of the workers are echoed by the new sub-clause 34(8) in 
the 2012/2013 collective agreement that protects workers’ wages, job security as 
well as conditions of employment. One respondent lamented the treatment he 
received from his previous and continues to receive from his current employer when 
he said, ‘[The employers] don’t work right with [workers]… factories are closing down 
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because the bosses are skelem (Afrikaans for thief)…’ The workers felt that employers 
were not honest in how they ran their businesses, citing that: 
‘...our provident fund money is not up to date. Our sick fund money is short from last 
year (2013) and it makes me frustration…when you deduct my money to put in my 
provident and sick fund, I expect it to be there, I don’t want to receive letters from 
the union saying it’s short….’ 
 It was nonetheless interesting to find that resentment of employers did not 
transfer to positive attitudes towards SACTWU. Formal workers did not fault 
SACTWU for causing factory closures per se, but for not taking action to prevent 
retrenchments from occurring. The following two quotations sum up what the 
workers thought of the union’s misgivings: 
‘We see a lot of factories closing down and when we ask the girls what the union 
did, they say they were there but nothing, and that’s what they say….’ 
‘I don’t know of any instance where the union helped someone after factory shut 
down, all the girls I have spoken to have not been helped….’ 
As mentioned above, the majority of workers had a good sense of the 
pressures facing the clothing industry; however, they had a poor understanding of the 
regulatory environment and the collective bargaining system. The findings revealed 
that workers were not aware of the increased wages versus job security trade-off, 
causing the industry to shrink, and mostly blamed the import tariffs and Chinese 
imports for the jobs lost in the industry. It appears the union may not be sufficiently 
honest or open with workers regarding the impact of the Chinese imports and the 
necessity of taking them into account when they negotiate wages at the bargaining 
council. 
4.3.2 Formal workers: attitudes towards sub-contractors evading the law 
There were several factories, both registered and unregistered that were 
subcontracted to do work for larger firms. Upon further inquiry it was found that 
larger clothing factories opened up smaller factories or outsourced to smaller 
factories where they would pay less in salaries. Godfrey, et al. (2005) commented 
that the commercial contract was the key mechanism that enabled these formal 
factories to effectively employ CMTs without fulfilling the obligations of employers 
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in terms of the labour regulations.144 The respondents have experienced the 
unscrupulous business practice of their employers first-hand, ‘The bosses closes one 
factory and open another using another name and that’s sad because we don’t get our 
money that they deduct for years, for me that is the main factor with those closures….’ The 
fear of not receiving provident funds led to resignations in Cape Town, with one 
large manufacturer receiving over 100 resignations between January and July in 
2008.145 As the only worker party on the bargaining council, the union is obliged to 
act against unscrupulous employers cheating its members and findings from this 
research suggest that it is not adequately representing its members.  
The union should exercise its unfettered authority to take industrial action 
against any firm that goes against collective agreements, in this case wage and job 
security as well as favourable working conditions. This obligation is inherent in trade 
union purpose and the authority was granted in sub-clause 34(8.9) of the 2012/2013 
collective agreement.146 The research scope limited it to only speaking to the workers 
and it was not possible to interview SACTWU leadership to find out if the 
organisation was aware of larger factories that were sub-contracting work to 
unregistered or non-compliant firms in order to pay less wages. Nevertheless, if this 
research could uncover these issues in a set of 30-minute interviews with workers, it 
is justifiable to think SACTWU, through continuous engagements with workers, 
would know about and be in a position to resolve this issue. 
4.3.3 Formal workers: home-based operations undercutting formal factories 
An outlying response came from one formal worker who showed awareness 
of home-based workers undercutting the formal factories, consequently resulting in 
fewer orders and leading to retrenchments. The small home-based operations 
typically charge less than formal factories because they often do not pay the 
stipulated bargaining council wage and mostly operate out of their home, which cuts 
down rental costs among other operational costs. The design houses and retail outlets 
prefer sending orders to the home-based firms in order to save on production costs, 
                                                 
144 Godfrey, et al., Development and Labour Monograph, 33. 
145 Vicentio, Investigating Growth Potential of the Clothing Industry and Identifying the Constrains of 
Growth, 10.  
146 National Bargaining Council (NBC) for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry, Extension to non-
parties of the National Main Collective Amending Agreement (Government Gazette, 12 April 2013), 
No 279. 
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‘…the small CMTs they open, so they kind of get production, the orders, they go to the small 
businesses and we get nothing, nothing at all….’ Outsourcing to home-based firms adds 
additional pressure to the formal factories operating in an already struggling industry.  
4.4 Informal Workers 
4.4.1 Level of understanding of the regulatory environment 
The informal or home-based workers (11 out of 14 interviewees) failed to 
articulate the duties SACTWU and the bargaining council. It was predicted that they 
would be able to state the role SACTWU played in their working lives during their 
time in the formal factory. The poor understanding of the bargaining council and the 
collective bargaining system, however, may be because ten of these informal 
workers have been out of formal employment in excess of ten years, and the 
bargaining council was only set-up in 2002. The union is a custodian of workers’ 
rights, and failure to remember this primary role by workers problematises 
SACTWU’s role in the clothing industry. 
In addition, the majority of workers associated SACTWU with salary 
deductions through membership fees, thus what they remember of SACTWU is 
negative because for them it was an organisation that reduced their cash wage. 
Workers do not seem to have a good understanding of why these fees were deducted 
from their wages and how they benefited from it during and after they left the formal 
factory. The negative attitudes workers have towards the union are formed on this 
basis, especially those who were retrenched and, for one reason or another, did not 
receive pensions (lump sum) and in turn blame SACTWU, ‘At blueberry, we worked 
the whole night through and he closed up the next day and he disappeared…we have heard 
nothing from him and he didn’t pay us….’ However, the provident fund is instead a 
responsibility of the bargaining council and not of SACTWU, which means these 
attitudes stem from a poor understanding of the regulatory environment governing 
the clothing industry. Nevertheless, it is SACTWU’s responsibility to educate 
workers about all facets of the industry and failure to do so may have contributed to 
the seeming confusion among workers. Additionally, SACTWU, as the only worker 
party at the bargaining council, should have helped the workers to receive their 
provident fund, even if the union itself was not responsible for the fund. The 
following statements summarise the attitudes of the majority of informal workers: 
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I was a member of the union, but the union do nothing for you, I am finished with the 
union … they are there to help the people mos but when you go there, they tell you 
another story, they don’t give you what you want … when I was in the factory, the 
union only came to talk about wages but never came back to us… 
All of these feelings culminated in an almost spontaneous move to home-
based work because they felt SACTWU was not able to assist them after being 
retrenched and they did not have any other choice. The union has a duty to protect 
the interests of workers in the clothing industry and with that duty comes an 
obligation to assist workers with problems they may encounter. 
On the other hand, there were three informal workers who understood union 
activities and expressed appreciation that the union performed its duties diligently. 
The three workers previously held shop steward and supervisory positions during 
their time in the formal factory prior to their factories closing down. Their previous 
roles in the formal factory exposed them more to union activities and put them in a 
position to acknowledge the union functions. The fact that only workers who 
previously held positions within union ranks understood the purpose of SACTWU 
exposed the poor relationship between SACTWU and formal workers. This means 
the union may not be engaging workers adequately- leading to a huge 
communication gap with the workers. 
4.4.2 Informal workers: SACTWU involvement in informal sector 
In as much as the informal workers felt that SACTWU could have done more 
for them while they were still formally employed in the factories, at least half of 
them felt that the union was necessary in the informal sector, ‘I know the union 
because when I leave here I will have nothing, I will have nothing, only my weekly wages….’ 
This informal worker lamented SACTWU’s absence in the informal sector because 
the provident fund is non-existent, as her employer is not registered and non-
compliant with bargaining council collective agreements. The lack of benefits and 
worker protection is one of the major challenges faced by informal workers who are 
vulnerable to their employers. Such comments from some of the respondents 
demonstrated the need for union presence in the clothing industry despite its 
shortcomings. 
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4.5 Wages Versus Job Security Trade-Off  
4.5.1 Informal workers: the union is to blame for factory closures 
An informal worker articulated the wage-job security trade-off well and 
spoke with much passion about this trade-off that has left many workers jobless. She 
believed that wage increases were the root cause of the factory closures and blamed 
the union for putting pressure on the employers to increase wages every year. She 
felt that the employers were not able to handle higher wage bills, particularly those 
with a large workforce. The respondent had this to say, ‘I can’t say I blame the bosses 
and with the wage increases every time, they can’t handle it … and it’s major big factories, 
with lots of people, so there are a lot of people unemployed….’ Wage increases over the 
past fifteen years have coincided with job losses, which may justify why workers 
claim that higher wage demands have eroded jobs in the industry. These findings 
resonate with Nattrass (2001) who found that it did not seem rational that workers 
would demand higher wages if they were fully aware of the consequences and 
understood the trade-off.147  
With regards to factory closures, the informal workers felt that the union 
should have intervened to keep the factories from closing. One worker said, ‘I think 
the union has a role to play in the closures because they must help the employers and tell 
them not to close … my boss tried to go to the bank, to the union but they wouldn’t help him. 
He tried to save the company for the girls but he couldn’t….’ The workers felt betrayed 
by the union that they entrusted with the authority to represent their interests, most 
importantly keeping their jobs. Out of the 14 workers, nine blamed the union for the 
lack of action to prevent the retrenchments from taking place. Barry Cline, owner of 
Barry Cline Design House is quoted as saying:  
‘Both the Bargaining Council and the union are tough. Legislation is killing the 
industry. By putting all this red tape around something that should be simple- 
starting a business in order to earn living- they are forcing people into the informal 
sector. The industry can make so many jobs if they stop being self-serving in their 
outlook’.148  
                                                 
147 Nicoli Nattrass, Wage Strategies and Minimum Wages in Decentralised Regions (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 874. 
148 Vicentio, Investigating Growth Potential of the Clothing Industry and Identifying the Constrains of 
Growth, 39-40. 
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Although it was not established if any of the workers were retrenched as a 
result of the 2012/2013 collective agreement, the deadlines149 given to employers to 
comply and factories served with writs of execution reported in the press, 
demonstrate the rigidity of the legislative framework. The union could have 
advocated for the pardoning of this particular employer or demanded moratorium 
from the bargaining council in the form of an exemption in order to ensure the 
workers remained employed. In as much as exemptions are granted to some 
employers, they appear to be part of the rigid clothing industry legislative framework 
because only employers who have applied are considered, leaving those that may 
need exemptions but not able to apply vulnerable to closure. A living wage is a 
priority for the workers in the clothing industry, however, this has to be balanced 
with preservation of employment, and it appears this balance will only be achieved 
through increased flexibility in the regulatory framework. Further studies to explore 
the effectiveness of ‘flexicurity’ such as in Denmark may be mandatory in order for 
the South African clothing industry to be progressive.  
4.5.2 Informal workers: the bargaining council is to blame for factory closures 
One respondent felt that the bargaining council was responsible for the 
closures. She was the only one to pinpoint the bargaining council as the responsible 
body when she said, ‘it’s very sad but I think it’s because of this new thing about this 
bargaining council, and it’s because the government freely let other countries come in you 
see … it’s a struggle nowadays…’ There was no probing due to time constrains, which 
would have revealed why and how she was certain the bargaining council was 
responsible for the factory closures. The reference to the changing times may be 
inferred to the transition from the Industrial Conciliation Act (1956) and the 
Industrial Councils to the LRA (1995) and a bargaining council that paved the way 
for parties to the bargaining council to request the Minister of Labour to extend 
collective agreements to non-parties. The respondent most likely read in the 
newspaper about the writs of execution by the bargaining council on non-compliant 
firms. The same respondent commented that the current closures were a political 
story and explained as such: 
                                                 
149 National Bargaining Council (NBC) for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry, Extension to non-
parties of the National Main Collective Amending Agreement (Government Gazette, 12 April 2013), 
No 279., clause 6 sub-clause (5) (ii). 
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My opinion is, they are just messing up this whole system, there are too many people 
that get money, paid for doing just nonsense, just upsetting the market and all those 
things. There are norms that you follow, that you are supposed to earn that amount 
and that but the way they are doing it, there is too much strikes and stuff. And I 
mean they are not doing the work, their monies don’t get pulled out when you strike 
…I don’t feel that[s] right, you talk things over and you come to a conclusion and 
then you settle that way, that is my opinion, not being so rowdy and going on and 
breaking people’s stuff. 
This respondent is part of the group of home-based workers that used to hold 
shop steward and supervisory positions during their employment in formal factories. 
This respondent, as well as two others who understood the union functions, shared 
the same sentiments and demonstrated a deeper understanding of the pressures facing 
the industry such as the continued strikes. In as much as they did not mention the 
wage demands being the lead cause of strikes, their responses suggest they 
comprehend the consequences of demanding higher wages year-on-year. 
4.5.3 Formal and informal workers: import tariffs/Chinese imports to blame for 
factory closures 
Of the 24 workers interviewed, 23 felt that the Chinese are playing a direct 
role in the decline of the industry. One informal worker said, ‘If you think back, the 
years they came in are the years we start struggling. Before the imports it was fine, from the 
time I started working 30 years ago. We had the occasional ups and downs but not like now. 
Not the amount of factories shutting now….’ Both groups felt the government allowed 
these cheap imports into the country and, as a result, their employers lost the price 
war, leading them to close down factories. A formal factory worker said, ‘I blame our 
own government for that because for the imports and you know, stuff, that’s why factories 
close because there is no work. Because everything they import is here in the shops. Our 
factories don’t have work because they are importing stuff….’  
The workers’ attitudes are shaped by their thoughts on the role of the 
government as well as clothing industry governing bodies like SACTWU. Both 
respondent groups felt that the government, SACTWU, and the bargaining council 
are not doing enough to keep foreign clothing from entering South Africa, because 
once imports enter the country, they are sold cheaper than South African clothing 
because South Africa has higher production costs than countries like China and 
Bangladesh. It is worse for South African clothing employers that cannot compete 
with clothing imports because SACTWU pushes wages higher annually and the 
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bargaining council embarks on compliance drives to force employers to comply with 
collective agreements regardless of whether they can afford or not. 
The direct consequence of these imports is the loss of a livelihood for the 
workers. This is especially dangerous in households where the mother is the sole 
breadwinner. The situation gets bleaker when one takes into account the quotation 
above, where a home-based worker talked about her existence in the informal 
clothing industry being under threat from the same Chinese clothing that got her 
retrenched, ‘Chinese people selling their goods so cheap … there is no way an ordinary 
person on the street can make something and live on it….’ It is interesting to see that the 
attitude held by the workers towards the Chinese imports are formed from the 
personal experiences they have had with reduced import tariffs that are the root cause 
of the increased clothing imports into South Africa post-1994.  
It was not clear where or how the workers had learnt of the impact of trade 
liberalisation, nevertheless it showed that they had a good understanding of the 
pressures facing the industry. Potentially, there is an issue of SACTWU blaming the 
retrenchments on cheap Chinese imports and failing to inform workers that, in as 
much as cheap imports are a problem in the industry; they are creating a context in 
which increased wages may lead to further job losses. What this might mean is that 
SACTWU may not be sufficiently open to workers about the impact of the cheap 
Chinese imports and how they should take them into account when negotiating 
wages at the bargaining council. 
In summary, both formal and informal workers demonstrated a poor 
understanding of the clothing industry regulatory environment. The workers typically 
ranged from either never having heard of SACTWU or the bargaining council, to 
knowing of its existence because of the various deductions on their wages, however, 
with very minimal understanding of its functions. The workers generally confused 
SACTWU with the bargaining council, which may be attributed to the lack of 
education by the union regarding the bodies that govern the regulatory framework of 
the industry. Nevertheless, despite lacking a good understanding of their regulatory 
environment, the workers demonstrated a solid understanding of the pressures facing 
the industry in the form of Chinese imports that according to them have crippled the 
industry.  
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4.6 Alternatives to the Current Wage Model and System of Collective 
Bargaining 
The majority of workers had never heard of the performance-based incentive 
pay, which would mean the bigger component of the wage would be incentivised, 
while the base wage was negotiated at the bargaining council. Worker unawareness 
of alternatives to the current wage structure broadly suggests that SACTWU, in an 
attempt to ensure regulation of the labour market, may have potentially withheld 
information from workers regarding these alternatives, or perhaps the workers just 
did not remember if SACTWU had explained these alternatives. Nevertheless, after 
the explanation of alternatives highlighted in this research, the workers generally 
showcased negative attitudes towards the performance-based incentive pay but 
retained interesting alternatives themselves, with some that were well thought out 
and clearly demonstrated the behavioural category of attitudes and willingness to 
change the status quo. 
4.6.1 Current pay model versus performance-based incentive scheme 
4.6.1.1 Formal workers: positive attitudes towards performance-based incentive 
pay 
Almost all the workers had never heard of this system before except for two. 
One worked under the system in Malawi, whilst the other worked under the system 
in Cape Town. 
I worked under that system in Malawi … ten people can produce production done by 
twenty people and so the Chinese would tell the supervisor to bring the top 
machinists and then measure everyone else and come up with a grading scale 
according to how many operations you could do and if you can reach your targets, 
so we were paid a different wage although we were all machinists…but when I come 
here the bosses follow what the union says and we get the same amount … I 
complain though because my type is hard to find and I get paid the same as someone 
who put a label on a shirt because they are called a machinist…the bosses should 
make grades to know who is performing and give them more money…I hit my targets 
every day and some people are playing, but we get the same. 
Noteworthy is the importance of high order output to the employers in 
Malawi highlighted by the respondent. This respondent seems to have understood 
that, in order to earn more, he had to produce optimally because his wage was 
directly proportional to what he produced while he was in Malawi. 
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Such findings challenge the union view on wages, where SACTWU has 
consistently pushed for higher wages annually despite the decreasing clothing orders 
because of international competition from countries like China or Mauritius, among 
other pressures facing employers. Taken from this perspective, SACTWU ought to 
consider the employers’ bottom lines when they enter into wage negotiations and the 
increase they demand should be in harmony with what the employer is producing. 
This might not be possible all the time with continued negotiations; however it is a 
first step towards matching production output (how much employers make per order) 
with labour costs among other operational costs. 
There was a correlation between workers who regarded themselves as 
efficient and hardworking, and an acceptance of performance-based incentive wage 
pay. The following quotation captures how the group of hard-working formal 
workers felt about the system, ‘…no, I have never heard of that system…I would want 
such a system and scrap the flat rate … I am fast, I am very fast I want that system…’ This 
resonates with the first cited respondent who worked under the system in Malawi and 
who would like his wages to reflect the amount of work he completes. These workers 
felt that it was a fair way of receiving their wages and would motivate them to work 
extra hard in order to receive a higher wage. It seems workers are not completely 
united regarding remuneration, meaning there is merit in trialling the employer-
suggested performance-based incentive model at the very least. This wage model has 
more merit than the union backed and failed 2011-wage agreement hailed as a 
hallmark that saw new job entrants receiving lower wages even when they were 
more talented and more efficient than existing workers. 
It is only logical for wages to reflect or be closely linked to productivity as 
every working moment is accounted for through what the worker produces, reducing 
‘wasted’ hours. SACTWU will therefore only negotiate the base wage, whilst 
workers assume responsibility for their wages through productivity-related incentive 
pay. 
Billikopf (2004) emphasised the importance of high production matched with 
the correct wage for keeping both employers and workers happy. Billikopf found that 
this incentive system offers the best and clearest link between the worker’s effort and 
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the reward.150 Rogerson (2010)151 found that the low production rate was among the 
greatest weaknesses of the clothing industry, which may explain why in 2005 the 
sector had the lowest wages in the textile industry at R217 per week in non-metro 
areas and R574 in metro areas.152 Godfrey and Theron (2012) attest to the industry 
facing a crisis and highlight low wages as one factor of the crisis.153 The proposed 
alternative wage structure allows workers the chance to raise their wages through 
hard work because the largest portion of the wage is incentivised.  
Despite SACTWU’s fight for higher wages, the clothing workers remain 
lowly paid compared to other textile workers in South Africa. It certainly presents a 
good case for the productivity-related incentive pay because workers will be 
guaranteed of a base wage and can then determine their final wage based on their 
level of effort during the week. This pay model aims for fairness since workers on 
the same production line may receive different wages based on the effort they put in. 
The wage model also has the potential to solve the challenges facing employers of 
paying non-performing workers, which discontents exceptional workers. 
4.6.1.2 Formal workers: negative attitude towards performance-based incentive 
pay 
Out of the ten formal workers interviewed, eight were vehemently against 
performance-based incentive pay. With regards to these attitudes, the respondents’ 
feelings were informed mainly by evaluating periods when they would not be able to 
meet set targets due to several factors, some of which are beyond their control. One 
of the workers stated the following: ‘I don’t like it because what about the days I don’t 
produce, say if I work on a new style, so for 4-5 days a week I don’t produce my normal, 
what happens then? What am I gonna earn for the week? Rather leave it like that….’ These 
workers preferred the current pay model because it was more predictable and they 
knew exactly how much they would be receiving at the end of the month. Should 
performance-based incentive pay be introduced in the clothing industry, it should 
ensure that these fears are addressed as they are genuine concerns that would affect 
the workers’ wages.  
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4.6.1.3 Informal workers: attitude towards current pay model versus performance-
based incentive pay 
The informal workers understood the principles behind the performance-
based incentive pay once it was explained and generally expressed negative feelings. 
All 14 workers pointed out that it would be a demanding system to work under and 
contrary to the benefit of working in a more relaxed environment that they enjoy far 
more than the formal factory, ‘We are here now; it’s not too much pressure for me 
because we’ve only four people, maybe in a big factory…’ The relaxed environment 
unregulated workers described is appealing to them because some were retrenched 
due to ill-health and most are advanced in age, and so believe they would not meet 
the required targets in order to receive a decent wage, ‘[The] system would not work in 
CMT … for my age it wouldn’t work but maybe for a younger person can have energy … it is 
not a fair way of paying people….’  
It is difficult to see how the system would work in the context of home-based 
work because the majority of workers are not permanently employed, ‘I have never 
worked under the system and we don’t use it here because sometimes we have big orders and 
sometimes we’ve got small orders….’ These workers are only called in when there is a 
huge order or when there is pressure to complete an order on time. 
The informal workers were against the system, citing that they would not 
have agreed to work under the system even during their factory days, ‘[I’ve] never 
worked under such a system and will never work under such a system … I would not have 
taken it in the factory as well … I don’t know if they would have closed down or not with this 
system but no…’ The workers’ attitude gave a new view to the way the payment 
model needs to be looked at. One respondent felt that the alternative wage structure 
would have saved her job because of the way it is designed, ‘I think the system would 
have saved my job because I would go home with less money every week. I have a family to 
feed…’ These workers would have preferred to lose their formal jobs instead of 
adopting the performance-based incentive pay. Such strong negative attitudes 
towards an alternative wage model may go some way to explain the stance taken by 
SACTWU in the last ten years regarding productivity-related pay and the fear that 
employers will set impossible incentivised targets.154 There appears to be great 
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solidarity among workers against differential pay through incentives in the factory on 
the same production line.  
The respondents felt they would not trust employers to implement the system 
fairly and pay them accordingly should they exceed targets. One worker’s comment 
was representative of the majority voice, ‘…no, I will not trust my boss to pay me if we 
use the system, no way, it’s not gonna happen’. These workers perceive employers as 
crooks (skelem) and some have been victims of retrenchments wherein the employer 
disappeared without compensating them.  
4.6.1.4 Informal workers: attitude to SACTWU involvement in performance-based 
incentive pay  
Regarding union involvement in the event that the clothing industry adopted 
performance-based incentive pay, the respondents’ attitudes were almost evenly 
divided. There were some who, although favouring the system, would not trust the 
employers to fulfil their end but still did not see a role for the union. It was not 
ascertained why distrust of employers did not turn into confidence in SACWTU. 
However, it is possible that the poor relationship between workers and SACTWU as 
well as the lack of knowledge and understanding of union functions is an 
impediment to gaining confidence in the organisation. 
On the other hand, another set of respondents advocated for union 
involvement, citing that, ‘…you can do that if you have a problem, you can go to the trade 
union, you go speak about all this and you will be helped’. This goes to show that, among 
the workers who understand the union functions, there are some who hold positive 
attitudes because they understand how SACTWU can help them. The union appears 
to be necessary in the performance-based incentive pay structure as workers still 
need representation at the bargaining council to negotiate the base wage, incentive 
rate, the weekly target and how to calculate the target or the measures to be taken if 
materials like zips are late and workers are not able to work. Absence of the union in 
such a scheme may lead to employers determining targets and wage rates that are 
impossible for workers to reach, leading to unfair labour practice. Under the 
performance-based incentive scheme, the union will assume the role of custodian of 
the rights of workers, and ensure employers stay true to the system and pay workers 
fairly. 
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In summary, what is clear based on worker attitudes is that performance-
based incentive pay is not a feasible alternative mainly because of the trust it requires 
to be placed on employers that they do not already trust. Both formal and informal 
workers are wary of the weeks during which they are learning a new pattern and 
slow to reach their targets or when materials needed are delivered late, and how this 
will affect their weekly wage. Applying such a pay model in the Cape Town clothing 
industry would see particularly formal workers starving in the low production 
seasons. The pay model also disadvantages informal workers who only come to work 
whenever there is an order that requires more labour.  
4.7 Unregulated Home-Based Factories as an Alternative to Formal Work 
This category addressed the objective of the worker alternative of working in, 
or starting, a home-based factory after retrenchment, and sought to gauge the number 
of workers who viewed this as a viable option to earn a sustainable income outside of 
regulation by the bargaining council. Both respondent groups were aware of the 
existence of home-based workers, although a few had no knowledge of such 
operations in their neighbourhoods. Formal workers thought it was a good way to 
earn money but did not think that it was a viable alternative to the factory for them. 
The majority of the informal workers felt that it was a viable alternative based on the 
reduced transport costs, less stressful environment and a cash wage comparable to 
formal workers. There were a few informal workers who expressed concern for the 
lack of protection in the informal sector, and said they would welcome union 
intervention and the subsequent benefits that come with union representation. 
4.7.1 Attitude towards home-based factories  
4.7.1.1 Formal workers: attitude towards unregulated firms 
Almost all the formal workers were aware of the existence of home-based 
workers in their residential areas although the majority said they had never worked in 
this manner themselves. The formal workers felt it was not a viable alternative for 
them, but welcomed it for other people whom they felt stood a chance at making a 
living outside of the factory, ‘… Not really, I would not consider doing homework, I 
would rather find some other type of work’. It seems the workers enjoyed the stability 
that comes with formal factories despite the shortcomings. The workers seemed to 
look down on home-based work as beneath them and as something done only by 
59 
 
those who have failed in the formal factory. This type of thinking is similar to 
Vicentio’s findings regarding the youth that refuse to work in the clothing industry 
because it is beneath them, which has caused a skills shortage in the industry. 
The formal workers who felt that it was a legitimate means of making a living 
still preferred bargaining council regulation, ‘No, I don’t think I will go work there … no 
circumstance will make me leave the factory’. The fact that it is inconceivable for formal 
workers to leave the formal factory for unregulated firms means they see more 
advantages than disadvantages in regulation by the bargaining council. These 
attitudes towards home-based work holds true what Godfrey, et al. (2005)155 found in 
their study, where workers expressed that home-based work was never a choice but 
was a consequence of circumstances beyond an individual’s control, and the 
challenges associated with it far outweigh any positives. Almost all formal workers 
interviewed said that there were no advantages of working in a home-based operation 
when compared to the formal factory. This could be because none of the formal 
workers interviewed have had personal work experience in a home-based operation. 
When asked why some people were leaving formal factories to go and work 
in an unregulated environment, formal workers said, ‘… people are leaving because 
they can’t survive on that salary and sometimes you are the breadwinner in the family so you 
have to do what you have to do’. This was an interesting finding because home-based 
clothing operations have been known to pay workers less than the bargaining council 
wage. Although the majority of people working in home-based operations are the 
formal workers who left after retrenchments, a few are formally employed workers 
who left voluntarily. It could not be established whether these workers left formal 
employment in pursuit of better wages, better conditions of work or due to rumours 
regarding not receiving their provident funds. A large Cape Town manufacturer who 
participated in Vicentio’s (2008) study confirmed receiving over 100 resignations 
between January and July 2008 due in large part to the rumours regarding the 
provident fund.  
4.7.1.2 Informal workers: attitudes towards unregulated firms 
Respondents from the informal workers group demonstrated a much better 
understanding of the informal clothing industry in Cape Town. They were able to 
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articulate the advantages and disadvantages better than the formal factory workers 
and their experience of both environments weighed in heavily on their evaluation of 
each environment. It appears that home-based workers have a more holistic picture 
of the clothing industry, and are thus in a better position to express feelings towards 
the union, factory closures and retrenchments in the industry. 
When asked to compare a home-based factory to a formal factory, they had a 
clear point of reference and expressed affectively that they wanted nothing to do with 
formal employment, ‘I would never go back to factory because from the time I have been 
working here, I feel like working’. For the home-based workers, the formal factory 
inhibited them from fully expressing themselves because of the strict rules and 
hierarchy that exists and this is why they enjoy the informal factory more. The 
informal factory has upskilled them since they had to learn how to make a full dress 
for example, and not only a part of it. From the home-based worker perspective, the 
informal factory holds more advantages than the formal factory, ‘CMT you do different 
operations and factory you do same operation … CMT you have to learn how to make a full 
garment … different operations are nice’. Informal workers felt that home-based 
factories, though unregulated, offered them something better than the formal factory 
and took away the monotony of performing a single task all week or until the order 
was completed. 
The older informal workers held a negative attitude towards the formal 
factory because they did not believe they could still hold up the demanding workload 
and pace required in the formal factories. However, there were some younger 
workers who had left the factory as a result of a bad relationship with the supervisors 
and factory owners due to unpaid wages. Both the older and younger informal 
workers felt that the informal factory provided a more flexible work routine that 
suited the amount of money they were receiving, which according to them was very 
similar to their formal factory wages. This is in line with Vicentio’s study where she 
found that workers felt informal factories are more rewarding workplaces even 
though they do not comply with all labour regulations.156 
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Home-based machinists mentioned that they were receiving approximately 
R750 per week in wages and the formally employed machinists reported that they 
were receiving approximately R880 per week before the deductions and transport 
costs. The 2012/2013 collective agreement stipulated that a qualified machinist 
should receive R784 in a metro area like Cape Town. In the light of these wages 
reported by the two groups of workers, home-based workers seem to have a better 
arrangement than formally employed workers, ‘[The] bargaining council wage rate for 
a qualified machinist is R800 and they take off and you get about R700 and then more 
deductions and take home even less…my wage now is almost the same as the factory after 
they deductions…’ With some home-based workers having expressed how they left 
the formal factory without their pensions, it becomes easy to understand why home-
based factories have mushroomed over the past fifteen years. 
4.7.1.3 Informal workers: positive attitude to SACTWU involvement in informal 
sector 
The unregulated workers brought to light the importance of the union, 
bargaining council and, more broadly, a legislative framework in the clothing 
industry that will protect their interests. A statement from an informal respondent 
sums up their attitude towards the union: ‘there is stuff that you want from the union and 
they are prepared to give it to you … sick book, pension you can withdraw when you get 
retired, many things you will never get now…’ These workers have a yearning for a 
better life that is protected by the union and the legislative framework at large, 
another worker said, ‘I know SACTWU because when I leave here, I will have nothing, I 
will have nothing, only my week’s wages’. This worker outlined the lack of benefits like 
the provident fund challenge facing unregulated workers who do not make 
contributions to these funds during their employment. Such a situation presence 
SACTWU with an obligation to find ways of incorporating home-based workers into 
the regulatory environment so that they may reap benefits enjoyed by formal 
workers. 
There were six home-based workers who lamented the lack of regulation in 
the informal factories. These informal workers appear to have been saddened by the 
lack of benefits they used to enjoy in the regulated clothing factories that complied 
with collective agreements.  
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‘To tell you the truth, CMTs are not good, not all of them, sometimes there is not 
even holiday pay at the end of the year. They only pay out your weekly wages. But in 
the formal factory, that’s where you get something out, you’ve got your holiday pay, 
you’ve got your bonus … so there is something you get out of a big factory … you 
get sick by the big factory, you get a book you can go to the doctor, not by a small 
factory’ 
Several informal workers, although having been retrenched, appreciated the 
protection and other social benefits they received while in the formal factory that 
they do not have anymore. ‘[There are] more benefits in the big factory, none in the 
CMT…when you register with the bargaining council, when you leave, you can go and claim 
that money … I picked up R5000 after working for two years, so you work more years, you 
get more money’. It appears the consequence of receiving wages that are comparable 
to the bargaining council gazetted wage comes with its own pitfalls that the informal 
workers are not happy with.  
These respondents contradicted their fellow home-based workers who saw no 
benefit from their union membership. This presents a dichotomy of views amongst 
the informal workers themselves that is difficult to resolve nevertheless, there are 
strong undertones demanding union involvement within the informal clothing 
industry, particularly for the benefits mentioned above.  
4.7.1.4 Informal workers: negative attitude to SACTWU involvement in informal 
sector 
All the workers who had a negative attitude towards formal factories did not 
think that there was a role for the union in the informal establishments. One of the 
respondents commented that, ‘…there is no need for the bargaining council in CMT, the 
different CMTs pay differently and that’s fine…’ The negative attitudes towards the 
union persisted because these workers held the union responsible for either the 
factory closures or for not doing enough to limit the retrenchments. These negative 
attitudes are exacerbated by the fact that some blame the union for their current 
positions. It is interesting how, although mentioning that they feel better working in 
home-based factories, some workers still hold negative attitudes towards the union.  
4.7.1.5 Outlying findings: Compliant home-based factories 
There were a few home-based factories that were registered with the 
bargaining council and deducted money for inter alia the sick fund, while issuing 
sick books that the employees could use at designated clinics. Workers at these 
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factories nevertheless felt that the deductions were not fair and wanted their full 
wage because they did not trust the employer to consistently pay the bargaining 
council and suspected that the same thing that had occurred previously, where they 
did not receive their packages when they were retrenched, would take place again. It 
is this distrust that made these workers think that the productivity-based incentive 
pay would not work for them. The views of the regulated home-based workers 
receiving the bargaining council and union benefits are in direct contrast to those in 
unregulated home-based operations that are not receiving such benefits. Further 
inquiry into both regulated and unregulated home-based operations is essential to 
establish a working solution to the problem of compliance with bargaining council 
regulations.  
In summary, home-based workers possess the most holistic view of the 
clothing industry because they have been in the industry longer and have experienced 
both the informal and formal environments. The majority of these workers left the 
formal factory as a result of retrenchment, with some of them not receiving their 
pensions, which partly explains the negative attitudes they have towards the union. 
Although the bargaining council administers pensions, the union is held responsible 
because both formal and informal workers often confuse the two bodies and are not 
able to adequately explain their functions. Homeworking is a mainly spontaneous 
reaction to retrenchments for most workers because they are breadwinners in the 
family and need to make a living. The formal workers understood that it was a good 
way to make money; however, none of them viewed it as a viable option for 
themselves. This meant that the security of employment that came with a large 
establishment and the regulation of the law were more important for the formal 
workers than the advantages of zero transport costs that came with home-based 
factories. 
4.8 Worker Co-operatives 
The DTI defines a primary co-operative, which encompasses a worker co-
operative as, ‘…an autonomous group of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations, through a jointly owned and 
democratically controlled enterprise’. As mentioned in chapter two, the Co-operatives 
Act (2005) regulates co-operatives in South Africa; however, the asynchronous 
relationship that exists with labour legislation excludes co-operatives from the ambit 
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of the LRA (1995). Co-operatives are worker-owned and offer the potential of a less 
exploitative work situation than one might find in an informal home-based factory.  
Co-operatives aim to equip workers with necessities such as aptitude to start 
and run a clothing business outside of the formal factory. The worker co-operatives 
are also a measure towards curbing or consuming the retrenched workers and taking 
them out of unemployment because those who cannot acquire jobs in the home-based 
factories mostly sit at home as part of the unemployed. 
4.8.1 Formal and informal workers: attitude towards worker co-operatives  
All of the 24 formal and informal respondents except for one had never heard 
of a co-operative prior to the explanation given during the interviews. The workers 
were evenly divided regarding interest in taking up the scheme and becoming part of 
a worker co-operative. The workers appreciated that the worker co-operatives would 
equip them with more decision-making authority and the working relationship would 
change from employee to owner. Workers thought that worker co-operatives would 
improve their standards of living, thereby overcome some of the socio-economic 
challenges they are facing. The uniformity of attitudes shows that worker co-
operatives appeal to the formal and informal workers and are a legitimate alternative 
to unemployment after retrenchments. 
4.8.2 Positive attitudes towards worker co-operatives 
The majority of workers, both formal and informal, expressed a positive 
attitude towards changing the working relationship from that of owner/manager and 
worker to one of co-ownership among workers, ‘I would like to do something like this 
but you have to have money. If the government gave me money, I would do it…I can make a 
better living for myself…it’s better than working in a factory….’ The formal and informal 
workers felt that they needed more decision-making powers, particularly because 
they felt that their opinions were not considered, thus changing the working 
relationship was a big incentive for workers.  
The explanation of the worker co-operatives during the interviews only gave 
insight into what and how the organisation functions and did not address the merits 
and demerits, which was a methodological limitation of the study because such a 
discussion would have enlightened the workers of the inherent risks, such as the 
possibility of earning less than their current wage. Payne found that workers in the 
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co-operatives in Newcastle were earning up to 75 per cent less than the bargaining 
council wage but preferred this to unemployment however; it was not clear whether 
the workers preferred a co-operative to formal employment.157 On the other hand, 
Cape Town workers vehemently objected to any alternative that reduces their wages 
beyond R100 per week, which problematises the successful introduction and uptake 
of worker co-operatives in Cape Town.  
Worker co-operatives present a good case for absorbing retrenched workers. 
SACTWU has often criticised the co-operatives mainly in the KwaZulu-Natal region 
as being bogus and evading the law because the Co-operatives Act (2005) does not 
regard co-operative members as employees and therefore do not fall under the LRA 
(1995). Once the loophole that exists in the Co-operatives Act (2005) is resolved by 
the amendments to the Act and worker co-operatives are covered by the LRA (1995), 
it is reasonable to suggest that the issue of the bogus co-operatives reported in the 
press to be prevalent in KwaZulu-Natal will be curbed. The amendments also have to 
address the issue of further bogus co-operatives that may evade the law by artificially 
breaking up firms employing more than 50 people into two in order to fit the 
classification of a co-operative.  
4.8.3 Negative attitudes towards worker co-operatives 
The respondent who had the most knowledge about the clothing industry, 
starting from the role of the union, to performance-based incentive pay that he had 
worked under in Malawi, was the only one to out-rightly reject the scheme. In his 
view, it is not enough to be given capital to set up a co-operative and the individuals 
should be willing and able to run the business. The respondent showed a lot of 
insight and perspective, which shed light on how else to assess the scheme. He said 
that: 
‘No, I would not be open to starting my own co-operative … the government might 
give you capital but if you don’t know what to do, you will fail … how I see it myself 
is if I don’t work and sweat for that money, I am not gonna use it properly, I will not 
know how to control that money … you can’t just give people money because they 
have not planned, they should earn their own money and have a plan first because 
they will end up buying beers … there are opportunities yes.’ 
This respondent opened a new debate with his comments about the worker 
co-operatives, however due to time constrains, this line of inquiry could not be 
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pursued with other respondents. He inadvertently questioned the policy 
implementation process where he cited the need for all-encompassing support like 
training on basic business skills if co-operatives are to succeed in Cape Town. He 
noted that what will be more useful for clothing workers is an end-to-end scheme 
that provides capital, opens up trading channels, and assists with equipping workers 
with skills of running a sustainable business with a high lifetime value. SACTWU 
has worked with the Fibre Processing and Manufacturing Skills Education and 
Training Authority (FP&M SETA) to establish training programmes, with very 
limited success.  
Workers felt that current factory owners have expertise to run a business, a 
skill they felt they did not possess. This is in line with the amendments to the Act 
that have been sitting in the office of the President of South Africa Jacob Zuma from 
2012 to date. In addition to closing the loophole that will see co-operative members 
covered by the LRA (1995), the amendments will also set-up support agencies such 
as the co-operatives advisory council. The support agencies will assist the 
predominantly poorly educated clothing workers on running a business and 
acquainting them with knowledge of the clothing value chain. It is possible the 
workers are intimidated by the thought of running a business, perhaps due to low 
levels of education, and establishing training programmes specifically for building 
basic business skills may overcome this fear.  
4.8.4 Challenges of setting-up a co-operative 
The cognitive attitudinal category was informed by the initial rationalisation 
of the worker co-operative scheme and evoked feelings of fear in both the formal and 
informal workers, as they did not clearly understand the scheme. However, after a 
brief explanation of worker co-operatives during the interviews, the workers slightly 
comprehended the tenets of the scheme. The workers were apprehensive about 
starting a co-operative because they feared that they would not be able to raise the 
capital required, one respondent said, ‘I would like to do something like this but you have 
to have money. If the government gave me money, I would do it…I can make a better living 
for myself, it’s better than working in a factory’ and another respondent said, ‘… the help 
I will need to financial …[a] co-operative will further develop my work…’ This respondent 
expressed how becoming a worker-owner would empower her because worker co-
operatives equip her with decision-making authority and ability to determine how the 
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organisation operates since they are run democratically. On top of financial fears, the 
workers mentioned the difficulty of acquiring orders in order to keep up a constant 
flow of work. 
Some of the workers commented that the government should help them 
acquire orders should they start a worker co-operative and alluded to stopping 
imports from China as another means of creating demand in the clothing industry, 
‘They mustn’t make imports come. Like there’s lots of pattern makers and designers and so 
they can do their own work…’ On the one hand, this is not farfetched as strict import 
tariffs under the National Party ensured that 93 per cent of clothing was produced 
locally, thereby forcing South African retailers to purchase from local manufacturers. 
On the other hand, post-1994 South African government put in place temporary 
restrictions on Chinese clothing imports in 2007 and 2008 with limited success 
because Chinese imports still rose to 61 per cent, whilst illegal imports also rose 
during this period. What this means is the solution to the crisis facing the clothing 
industry does not lie with restricting Chinese imports alone and needs to be tackled 
from many angles, starting with Amendments to the Act that have been sitting with 
the President of South Africa Jacob Zuma for two years (2012-2014) that will see the 
LRA (1995) cover co-operative members. 
4.8.5 Attitude towards SACTWU involvement in the worker co-operatives 
Despite understanding very little about the functionality of the worker co-
operatives, workers from both respondent groups felt there was no room for the 
union. The retrenched workers in home-based operations hold bitter feelings towards 
the union that they feel should have done more to help them in terms of ensuring the 
factories do not close or helping them receive their pensions, which they did not 
receive or felt short-changed by. There was a minority group from both formal and 
informal workers that felt the union would be useful in the scheme, however they 
could not expound why they felt this way. A further, more in-depth study is 
necessary in order to acquire more information on worker co-operatives and their 
effectiveness in curbing unemployment in the clothing industry, especially using 
comparative studies in other industries and regions where the scheme has been 
implemented with some success. 
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In summary, both respondent groups understood what the worker co-
operatives are about but only on the surface and struggled to fully comprehend how 
the worker co-operatives would function in practice, especially the fact that the co-
operatives have to be self-sustaining without much help from third parties. 
Therefore, except for the respondent who worked in Malawi, every other worker did 
not show any real cognitive, affective nor behavioural attitude towards this 
alternative. Both formal and informal workers need more information about the 
scheme in order to develop a good understanding of, and how they could benefit. 
SACTWU in conjunction with the DTI should take initiative in educating Cape 
Town clothing workers about worker co-operatives as an alternative to 
unemployment after retrenchment or for workers in formal factories who want to 
become owners. Mondragon in Spain is a case in point that proves the effectiveness 
of worker co-operatives and a good reason for initiating a conversation regarding 
institutionalising the worker co-operatives within the Cape Town clothing industry.  
4.9 Worker-suggested alternatives to the current system 
As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, workers demonstrated a good 
understanding of the pressures facing the clothing industry, however it was not clear 
how they came to know of these pressures- possibly through the press. Such findings 
are interesting because the majority of workers interviewed did not showcase a good 
understanding of the regulatory environment, nor did they show a full understanding 
of the regulating bodies such as SACTWU, but they were able to articulate the 
pressures. The most significant response was from an informal home-based worker 
who suggested the following as a viable alternative, ‘…you don’t want to retrench 
everybody, so you can work three days this week, you can work two days next week. So that 
everybody can have a fair chance to have money, even if not a lot, but you get something’. 
This respondent outlined a model similar to the Training Layoff Scheme (TLS) 
piloted in 2009 and run by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA).158 The TLS provides employers in mainly financial distress an 
opportunity to recover by placing some of the workers on training programmes that 
will be combined with short time.159 Workers avoid retrenchment by receiving 75 per 
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cent of their basic wage, whilst the employer saves on the wage bill. The National 
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa explored this alternative and saved 143 jobs 
as 372 workers completed the training. The clothing industry is faced with a large 
skills shortage with the growth of informalisation and retirement of the ageing 
workforce that is not adequately replaced. Workers in Newcastle have already agreed 
to wages that are 75 per cent less than their basic wage, which means that TLS 
present a legitimate alternative to the current system.  
When asked for an alternative to formal factory work, one respondent said, 
‘start your own business, and if someone can help me with 2-3 machines I can start 
something. There is too much qualified people out there but no jobs for them. Some bosses 
don’t want to employ 45 years and above unless they know you’. Despite working in an 
unregulated factory already, this respondent threw light on how informal workers 
may have come to the decision to work for a home-based factory after circumstances 
in the formal factory pushed them out. Such findings also point to the potential of 
worker co-operatives in the Cape Town clothing industry, which might avoid the 
potentially exploitative relationship mostly found in the informal factories that some 
of the workers highlighted.  
The attitudes displayed by the workers on alternatives to factory closures 
belong to the behavioural category that encompasses actions and intentions to act, 
according to Eagly and Shelly (1998).160 These actions or intentions to act are in 
reaction to the object of the attitude, which in this case is regulation by the 
bargaining council.  
4.10 The Contentious Sociological Standpoint on Attitudes 
The lack of understanding of SACTWU functions by six formal workers 
brings the sociological standpoint on cognitive behavioural attitude into question. 
Collective bargaining is a complex process that involves various facets, such as 
contentious wage negotiations. It is therefore essential for workers to have 
knowledge of the regulatory environment and a good understanding of the collective 
bargaining system if they are to hold cognitive behavioural attitudes to the subject of 
the attitude, which in this case are SACTWU and the bargaining council. This is 
however not possible if SACWTU makes contact with workers, ‘…once or twice a 
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year to check who is permanent…’ or ‘...when they want to order strikes around increase 
time….’ This information could not be corroborated as the only information found on 
the SACTWU website pertains to inter alia regional and branch meetings. Findings 
from this exploratory study suggest that worker apathy/absenteeism at union 
meetings and a poor understanding of the regulatory environment is a premise on 
which to challenge the sociological standpoint on cognitive behavioural attitudes of 
workers in the clothing industry. 
This poor understanding of the legal framework might mean that workers are 
not in a position to contribute meaningfully to bargaining council negotiations. 
Additionally, only three workers said that they actively participated in union 
activities and the rest were apathetic and preferred taking their lunch break instead of 
attending union meetings.  
The union address of workers takes place during lunch time and is likely to 
receive very little attention because workers only have 30-minute lunch breaks, 
which is not sufficient time for the workers to digest information as they are not able 
to probe and ask clarity-seeking questions should they have any. Furthermore, there 
is high pressure to finish the meeting so that workers may eat before going back to 
the factory line. Workers may also chant in agreement even when they do not fully 
understand the explanations on either wages or conditions of employment that the 
union takes up to the bargaining council. 
4.11 Reflection on Research Methods and Findings 
The interviews were very emotionally charged since the subject affected the 
workers’ livelihoods and addressed matters that were close to their hearts. In order to 
proceed with the interviews in instances where respondents became emotional, the 
feminist approach was helpful because it allowed sensitivity to their feelings. 
Traditional interviewing is commonly associated with a masculine paradigm and 
devoid of emotions, which could have impacted negatively on the manner in which 
respondents shared their true feelings. Reading, learning and adopting the feminist 
approach to interviewing thus helped get richer data from the respondents. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.1 Overall Conclusions 
The scope of the study was to explore Cape Town clothing workers’ attitudes 
towards regulation of the clothing industry by the bargaining council and possible 
alternatives that may mitigate further job losses and possibly create employment. The 
findings were not sufficient for the study to conclude definitively that any available 
alternative will help save jobs and thus better than the current wage model and 
system of collective bargaining.  
The study found that Cape Town clothing workers have a remarkably poor 
understanding of the regulatory environment and demonstrated overall ignorance of 
the functions of both SACTWU and the bargaining council, to the extent that they 
confused the two bodies. This ignorance suggests a disconnect or poor relationship 
between workers and SACTWU, which is responsible for representing worker 
interests. The research found that workers do not think SACTWU is representing 
them adequately, however could not conceive of any alternative system that did not 
involve union representation.  
In the case of Cape Town, it is not clear that any alternative wage model that 
attempts to match worker output with their wage is viable as most workers do not 
trust employers to implement such a model fairly. Cape Town workers are convinced 
such a wage structure would leave them worse off. This begs the question whether 
this is typical or atypical of the industry more widely and any alternative wage 
model.  
Findings on the Chinese imports opened up a debate about the pressures 
facing not only the clothing industry, but also the broader South African market 
environment. This is a significant finding because it was not part of the initial scope 
of the study. It also opens up room for further research into other pressures that may 
be facing the clothing industry and setting up a context that affects other decisions, 
such as increased wages, leading to additional job losses. Workers reflected on pre-
1994, hitherto trade liberalisation and the relaxation of import tariffs, and noted how 
the industry was more stable and very rarely experienced factory closures. The 
implications of the finding is that external pressures have played a massive role in 
the decline of the clothing industry and set a context in which increased wages in 
72 
 
addition to other pressures negatively impacted employers, resulting in 
retrenchments and factory closures. 
5.2 Wage-Job Security Trade Off 
Workers had a poor understanding of the system of collective bargaining, 
which meant both respondent groups did not have a good understanding of the trade-
off that exists between increased wages and job losses prior to the explanation during 
the interviews. The findings showed that the union does not warn workers about the 
possibility of retrenchment or factory closures as an outcome of increased wage 
demands that employers cannot cope with, especially in the face of increased 
pressure from cheap Chinese imports. In turn, workers blame SACTWU for not 
doing enough to save their jobs or keep factories from closing. There is a need for 
flexibility if the industry is to preserve jobs whilst maintaining a living wage and 
SACTWU should champion the establishment of this regulatory flexibility, as it is 
the only worker party on the bargaining council. For example, collective agreement 
exemptions are only considered for a firm that has applied, which leaves those that 
have not applied vulnerable to closure if they are not able to meet the bargaining 
council deadlines. 
5.3 Performance-Based Incentive Pay 
The findings reflect diverse views regarding the performance-based incentive 
pay. The few workers who described themselves as hardworking wanted the wage 
structure introduced because they wanted their wage to reflect their effort and 
separate them from underperforming colleagues. These workers were strong 
advocates for the same wage for workers on the same production line, which shows 
solidarity among workers regarding wages and justifies the strong union stance on 
the introduction of performance-based incentive pay. The lack of trust in employers 
based on previous experiences when workers were cheated is the biggest impediment 
to favouring the alternative wage model. This means current solidarity and common 
acceptance of the bargaining council negotiated wage is driven by fear of being 
treated unfairly.  
The findings show that SACTWU does not inform workers about alternative 
wage models, thereby not fulfilling its obligation to represent worker interests and 
complete transparency. It is possible that SACTWU does not fully engage workers 
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regarding alternatives to the current system because of fear that these alternatives 
will break the union. Nevertheless, as discussed above and echoed by some of the 
workers, the union remains necessary to negotiate the base wage, the incentivised 
rate, and production targets, among other terms and conditions of employment under 
such a pay model. Despite failing to clearly outline union functions and the overall 
negative attitude towards the union, it was striking how workers could not conceive 
the industry going forward without union representation. What this means is that any 
alternative to the current collective bargaining system and regulatory framework has 
to include SACTWU or at least attain its buy-in to stand a fighting chance in the 
Cape Town clothing industry. 
5.4 Home-Based Work 
Workers were aware of the existence of informal factories in their 
neighbourhoods. It was generally viewed as a viable alternative to the regulated 
factory and provided mostly retrenched workers with a source of income. The 
outlined advantages were reduced transport costs and the stress-free working 
environment of the workers as well as the take-home pay that was comparable to the 
bargaining council gazetted wage. From the findings, home-based factories have 
absorbed a large number of retrenched workers who would not want to return to the 
formal factory if given the chance. These workers enjoy working in the informal 
factory more, where a machinist on average receives approximately R750 per week, 
comparable to the bargaining council base wage of R784 on a 0.5 per cent 
productivity incentive scheme.161 Formal workers have the chance to earn more than 
unregulated workers on the productivity-related wage model, however, as deductions 
exist in the regulated factory, their take-home pay may be similar or less than that of 
unregulated workers. Interestingly, formal workers were not willing to receive wages 
that were lower than the bargaining council wage. This suggests that SACTWU may 
be engaging workers regarding annual wage increases and may be facing increased 
pressure from the workers for better wages because workers themselves understand 
both the pressures facing the industry as well as their own social and economic 
pressures. 
                                                 
161 National Bargaining Council (NBC) for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry, Extension to non-
parties of the National Main Collective Amending Agreement (Government Gazette, 12 April 2013), 
No 279. 
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Home-based workers were aware of the inherent disadvantages of the unregulated 
factories that leave workers vulnerable in the event they become sick or leave the 
factory since they do not make fund contributions. SACTWU and the bargaining 
council should begin working with these factories, for example, through a policy of 
flexicurity adopted in Denmark, as opposed to shutting them down because they will 
continue to be difficult to locate should their existence be threatened and continue to 
undercut formal firms. The strength of these unregulated factories is shown in their 
working relationships with design houses that outsource to them without contracts, 
with the entire operation running on trust. Further research is necessary in order to 
determine the best way to deal with unregulated home-based factories, however what 
remains apparent is the need to institutionalise them into the Cape Town and more 
widely, the South African clothing industry formal economy.  
5.5 Worker Co-operatives 
Prior to the explanation of worker co-operatives during the interviews, both 
formal and informal workers were not aware of their existence. After the 
explanation, both respondent groups were very receptive to the initiative because 
they were interested in converting the working relationship from manager and 
worker to worker as owner, thereby showcasing the entrepreneurial spirit that is at 
the core of worker co-operatives. The formal and informal workers viewed finances 
as the biggest challenge to running a co-operative efficiently and expressed 
willingness to joining a co-operative should they receive adequate financial support. 
The two groups of workers were interested in gaining more decision-making powers; 
however, their attitudes were shaped from a lack of full understanding of the inherent 
risks of lower wages.  
Some of the formal and informal workers were wary of the risks involved and 
for them these risks outweigh the advantages co-operatives may bring. It is possible 
that, given time for further explanations, workers may be even more receptive. It 
does not seem as though both worker groups would take up any alternative that 
involves them receiving wages that are lower than the bargaining council wages, 
which contradicts findings in Newcastle where workers accepted wages that were 75 
per cent less of the bargaining council gazetted wage. 
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There certainly is a case for further research on alternatives to clothing 
industry regulation by the bargaining council. The industry is shrinking, despite the 
union holding positive views about the future. Home-based work now accounts for 
approximately 25-30 per cent of South African clothing. Design houses continue to 
outsource to home-based factories, all to the detriment of the industry as these 
unregulated factories undercut formal factories. The traction in home-based factories 
demonstrates that the industry is not dead, but only needs correct measures to 
rejuvenate it and these measures can be uncovered through further research. Worker 
training programmes will be at the heart of the rejuvenation exercise because, as seen 
in the randomly selected sample, the labour force is ageing and that is an additional 
pressure on this labour intensive industry. Further research that maps the future of 
the industry, both formal, informal and worker co-operatives is required that 
practically tests the effectiveness of existing and potential alternatives to bargaining 
council regulation of the clothing industry.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Formal workers interview schedule 
Introductory section: demographics 
 
 
 
 
 
Age: 
Gender: 
Race: 
Highest level of education: 
History in the clothing industry 
 How long have you worked in the clothing industry? 
 Were you employed elsewhere before entering the clothing industry? 
 Have you worked for any other company other than your current employer 
in the clothing industry? 
 Roughly how long did you stay at each firm? 
 What were your reasons for leaving in each case? 
 Do you intend on staying with your current employer until you retire? 
 What does your job entail? 
Trade-off between regularly negotiated wages and retrenchments 
The wages are negotiated at the bargaining council and they have increased 
quite substantially over the years through the push by the trade union. The issue is 
that there has also been a lot of retrenchments as wages have gone up. The reality is 
Name of interviewee:  
Position:  
Contact number: 
Company: 
Date of interview: 
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workers stand a chance to earn more, however, lose their jobs in the process. This is 
the issue that is out there and a topic of immense debate. 
 Are you aware of the existence of SACTWU? 
 Are you a member of SACTWU? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what are the functions of SACTWU? 
 To what extent is SACTWU fulfilling its mandate? 
 How often do you make contact with union representatives? 
 Do you feel the union represents your best interests? 
 What are your thoughts on factory closures? 
 Are you aware of the reasons why these factories shut down? 
 Do you feel this will ever affect you personally? 
 Do you think the union plays a role in the closing of factories? 
 What alternatives are available to limit or stop factories from closing? 
 How do you think the factory closure situation could best be addressed? 
 Before my explanation, did you know what the bargaining council is? Did 
you have an understanding of what goes on at the bargaining council? 
 How often, if at all, are you informed or do you receive feedback about the 
bargaining council activities by your union? 
 What are your thoughts on these activities? 
 Do you feel the agreements reached address the challenges you face at the 
workplace and outside the workplace? 
 How do you feel about the bargaining council agreements being extended 
across the industry? 
 What are the implications of such actions on people like you and the 
clothing industry at large? 
 How does SACTWU consult you? 
 Do you participate in union activities and attend meetings? 
 Do you feel you have control over how much you get paid? 
 What does SACTWU say about the dangers associated with having high 
wages in the meetings? 
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Wages 
 Do you know what the bargaining council wage is currently? 
 What is your wage compared to the bargaining council wage? 
 Would you be prepared to take a lower wage to save your job? 
 How much lower would you go? 
Incentive pay/piecework 
This is a system of payment in which a proportion of a worker’s earnings is 
related to the level of output produced by the individual. In the clothing industry, a 
worker will be paid per unit (garment) produced regardless of time. A fair rate is an 
amount that equates to a living wage and allows an average worker to be paid the 
minimum wage per hour if they work at an average rate. Merits of this system are 
that it motivates people to work hard beyond the natural work ethic of that individual 
in order to earn more, although with a lower basic wage. This is an advantage for the 
factory because it guarantees the costs per unit produced, which is useful for 
planning and forecasting purposes. Workers could earn more and the factory can 
become more productive, saving jobs in the process. 
 Before my explanation, did you know what incentive pay or piecework is? 
 Have you ever worked under such a scheme? 
 Does your current company use such a system? 
 What pay model do you use at your company? 
 Which pay model do you feel is the best to reward workers and why? 
 Would you be open to an incentive pay? Why or why not? 
 Do you feel it is fair to be paid depending on how much you work/produce? 
 Do you think you can trust your superiors to remain faithful to such a 
system? 
 Would you rather all workers doing the same work get paid the same 
amount? 
 Do you think the bargaining council should regulate such a system? What is 
the reason for your answer? 
 Do you see a role for the union in this pay model? 
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Informalisation 
Informal employment is work that is unregulated and this process, by which 
work is increasingly unregulated with a large number of workers involved in such 
unregulated work, is called informalisation. These workers are involved in informal 
economic activities, which are, in law or practice, not covered by or sufficiently 
covered by formal arrangements such as the bargaining council or the LRA. An 
example of this in the clothing industry is homework. Homework is work undertaken 
for someone else for remuneration, whether in the worker’s own home or the home 
of another, other than the home of the employer. In essence, homework results in a 
product specified by the employer who is someone who either directly or through an 
intermediary gives out homework in pursuit of his business activity. In the clothing 
industry, intermediaries typically supply materials and instructions to workers who 
make the product and are usually paid per piece produced. Thus, homework can be 
seen as a form of sub-contracting. 
1. What attitudes do factory workers hold about operations not regulated with 
the bargaining council? 
 Have you ever worked at a home-based operation? 
 Are you aware of anyone in a homeworking operation? 
 What were the reasons for such a transition? 
 Are you aware that homeworkers undercut formal factory workers through 
accepting lower pay for orders? 
 What are your feelings towards this? 
 Would you consider home-based work ahead of your formal factory job? 
Why or why not? 
 Do you ever participate in part-time homework? 
 Do you consider it a legitimate alternative to a formal job in the factory? 
 Under what circumstances would you either be employed or establish your 
own homeworking operation? 
 What do you feel are the pros and cons of such operations? 
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Co-operatives 
A co-operative is an autonomous group of people united voluntarily to meet 
their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations, through a jointly 
owned and democratically controlled enterprise. The main objective is inclusive 
growth and development as well as decent employment and equity. Co-operatives are 
associations of people, who agree to be the owners, the makers of democratic 
decisions and the users of their joint enterprise. The main purpose as an economic 
unit is to promote their members by rendering services rather than maximising 
profits. These worker co-operatives primarily focus on providing employment to 
members. The co-operatives are bound by certain universal values such as self-help, 
self-reliance, self-responsibility, democracy, equality and social responsibility. Each 
member has one vote unlike a private company where whoever has the majority 
share-holding calls the shots. And each co-operative member contributes to the 
capital of the co-operative or through his or her labour. The Co-operatives Act 
provides for the registration of co-operatives that have adopted a constitution that 
complies with co-operatives principles and values. A minimum of five members is 
required to form a co-operative and there is no maximum number. 
The advantage of such worker co-operatives is that workers have complete 
control over their working environment since the members are worker-owners. 
However, some disadvantages include the lack of protection by the Labour Relations 
Act of 1995 although the bargaining council covers them. There are also bogus co-
operatives reported in the press as mushrooming, particularly in the Newcastle area, 
which are run by the former employers utilising the loopholes of the Act. 
 Before my explanation, did you have any knowledge of co-operatives? 
 Are you aware of any co-operatives? 
 Would you be open to establishing your own co-operative? Why or why 
not? 
 What opportunities do you believe exist in this sector? 
 What challenges do you believe exist in this sector? 
 What help do you envisage needing in order to develop a co-operative? 
 To what extent do you think such a scheme can further develop the work 
you are already involved in? 
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 Do you think a co-operative is a viable alternative means to generate 
employment and wealth? 
 What are your views on the bogus co-operatives that are said to have been 
established? 
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Appendix B: Informal workers interview schedule 
Introductory section: demographics 
Age: 
Gender: 
Race: 
History in the Clothing industry  
 How long have you been working in the clothing industry? 
 Which firms have you worked at before your current firm? 
 How long did you stay at each firm? 
 At which point did you move to the informal factory? 
 What were the reasons for leaving your formal job?  
Trade-off between regularly negotiated wages and retrenchments – SACTWU 
representation 
The wages are negotiated at the bargaining council and they have increased 
quite substantially over the years through the push by the trade union. The issue is 
there have also been a lot of retrenchments as the wages have gone up. The reality is 
workers stand a chance to earn more, however, lose their jobs in the process. This is 
the issue that is out there and a topic of immense debate. 
 Are you aware of the existence of SACTWU? 
 Were you a member of SACTWU during your time in the formal factory? 
 Are you currently a member of SACTWU? 
 To your understanding, what are the functions of SACTWU? 
 Did SACTWU fulfil its mandate as far as you can remember? 
 To what extent do you think SACTWU represented your core interests? 
Name of interviewee:  
Contact number: 
Company: 
Position: 
Date of interview:  
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 Do you feel you had control over how much you get paid? 
 Do you know what the bargaining council is? 
 Do you have an understanding of what goes on at the bargaining council? 
 How often, if at all did you get informed or get feedback about the 
bargaining council by your union?  
 What are your thoughts on factory closures? 
 Are you aware of the reasons why these factories shut down? 
 Do you think the union had a role to play in the closing of factories? 
 What alternatives are available to limit or stop factories from closing? 
 How do you think the factory closure situation could best be addressed? 
Wages 
 Do you know what the bargaining council wage is? 
 What is your wage compared to the bargaining council wage? 
 Would you have preferred a lower wage if it meant saving your formal job? 
 How much lower would you have accepted? 
Piecework 
A system of payment in which a proportion of a worker’s earnings is related to 
the level of output produced by the individual. In the clothing industry, a worker will 
be paid per unit (garment) produced regardless of time. A fair rate is an amount that 
equates to a living wage and allows an average worker to be paid the minimum wage 
per hour if they work at an average rate. Merits of this system are that it motivates 
people to work hard beyond the natural work ethic of that individual in order to earn 
more although with a lower basic wage. This is an advantage for the factory because 
it guarantees the costs per unit produced, which is useful for planning and forecasting 
purposes. Workers could earn more and the factory can become more productive, 
saving jobs in the process. 
 Before my explanation of this concept, what do you understand by piece 
rate or incentive pay? 
 Have you ever worked under the incentive pay system? 
 Is this a system you would have preferred during your factory working 
days? 
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 Do you think such a system could have saved your job or your other jobs? 
 Are you currently working under a piece rate system? 
 Do you think this pay system could work in the homeworking operations? 
 Is it a fair way of rewarding employees? 
 Do you see a role for the union in such a system? 
Informalisation 
Informal employment is work that is unregulated and the process by which 
work is increasingly unregulated with a large number of workers involved in such 
unregulated work is called informalisation. These workers are involved in informal 
economic activities, which are, in law or practice, not covered by or sufficiently 
covered by formal arrangements, such as the bargaining council or the LRA. An 
example of this in the clothing industry is homework. Homework is work undertaken 
for someone else for remuneration, whether in the worker’s own home or the home 
of another, other than the home of the employer. In essence, homework results in a 
product specified by the employer who either directly or through an intermediary 
gives out homework in pursuance of his/her business activity. In the clothing 
industry, intermediaries typically supply materials and instructions to workers who 
make the product and are usually paid per piece produced. Thus, homework can be 
seen as a form of sub-contracting. 
 In your experience, what are the major differences between the formal 
factory and the homeworking operation? 
 Is this better than a formal factory; if so, in what way is it better? 
 What are the pros and cons of homeworking? 
 With the experience you have, do you consider home-based work a valid 
alternative to formal factory jobs? 
 Would you consider going back to the formal factory? If so why or why 
not? 
 Would you re-join/join the union if you went back to the formal factory? If 
yes, why and if not, why not? 
 Do you feel you need protection from the union and bargaining council in 
the informal operations? If yes, what kind of protection? 
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Co-operatives 
A co-operative is an autonomous group of people united voluntarily to meet 
their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly 
owned and democratically controlled enterprise. The main objective is inclusive 
growth and development as well as decent employment and equity. Co-operatives are 
associations of people, who agree to be the owners, the makers of democratic 
decisions and the users of their joint enterprise. The main purpose as an economic 
unit is to promote their members by rendering services rather than maximising 
profits. These worker co-operatives primarily focus on providing employment to its 
members. The co-operatives are bound by certain universal values such as self-help, 
self-reliance, self-responsibility, democracy, equality and social responsibility. Each 
member has one vote unlike a private company where whoever has the majority 
share-holding calls the shots. Each co-operative member also contributes either to the 
capital of the co-operative or through his or her labour. The Co-operatives Act 
provides for the registration of co-operatives that have adopted a constitution that 
complies with co-operatives principles and values. A minimum of five members is 
required to form a co-operative and there is no maximum number. 
The advantage of such worker co-operatives is that workers have complete 
control over their working environment since the members are worker-owners. 
However, some disadvantages include the lack of protection by the Labour Relations 
Act of 1995 although the bargaining council does cover them. There are also bogus 
co-operatives mushrooming, particularly in the Newcastle area, which are run by 
former employers utilising the loopholes of the Act. 
 Before my explanation of this scheme, did you have any knowledge 
on co-operatives? 
 Are you aware of any co-operatives in your area? 
 Would you be open to establishing your own co-operative? Why or 
why not? 
 What are your views on the bogus co-operatives being established by 
employers where workers have no say in the working environment? 
 What opportunities do you believe exist in this co-operative sector? 
 What challenges do you believe exist in this co-operative sector? 
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 What help do you envisage needing in order to develop a co-
operative? 
 To what extent do you think such a scheme can further develop the 
work you are already involved in? 
 Do you think a co-operative is a viable alternative means to generate 
employment and wealth? 
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Appendix C: Research Concession Letter 
18 July 2013 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
This is to confirm that Wesley Maraire (Student Number MRRWES001) is 
registered for a Master of Philosophy degree in Labour Law within the Department 
of Commercial Law at the University of Cape Town. One of the requirements for the 
degree is that the student conducts research for a dissertation that is submitted for 
examination. I am the supervisor of Mr Maraire’s dissertation. 
Mr Maraire is researching the attitudes held by both formal and informal workers in 
the clothing industry around four issues, namely, the trade-off between higher wages 
and job security, incentive pay systems, informal homeworking, and co-operatives. 
For the purposes of this research Mr Maraire will be compiling a list of some formal 
and informal employers in the clothing industry. He will be contacting employers on 
the list with a view to arranging interviews with their employees. The interviews will 
be arranged at the convenience of employers and workers. We would greatly 
appreciate your cooperation with Mr Maraire when he conducts this research, both in 
terms of an interview with yourself and other workers in the clothing industry. Of 
course, you are not obliged to participate in the research. 
The research is for academic purposes but will probably result in a publication, either 
a working paper or journal article. However, we do not believe that there will be any 
harm to anybody as a result of their participation. All interviews will be conducted 
on the basis of anonymity and the information that is obtained will be treated as 
confidential and will be seen only by Mr Maraire and myself. 
Should you have any queries or concerns about the research please do not hesitate to 
contact me by email: shane.godfrey@uct.ac.za or telephone: 021-650 3504. 
Yours sincerely 
Dr Shane Godfrey 
  
93 
 
Appendix D: Participants consent form 
Title of study: Cape Town clothing industry workers’ attitudes to the consequences 
of and alternatives to regulations by the bargaining council. 
Principal researcher: Wesley Maraire Institution: University of Cape Town 
Background: You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you 
decide to participate in this study, please take the time to read the following 
information carefully. Please ask the researcher if there is anything that is not clear 
and you need more information. 
Purpose of this study: The research is for academic purposes in part fulfilment of 
the requirements for a Master of Philosophy degree in Labour Law but will likely 
result in a publication either as a working paper or a journal article. 
The research will seek to establish the attitudes held by workers in the formal and 
informal clothing industry around issues of: 
i. Trade-offs between regularly negotiated wage increases and job security 
ii. Production incentive systems 
iii. Informal homeworking 
iv. Co-operatives 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in this study is voluntary. It is up to 
you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be 
asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part in this study, you are still free 
to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. You are free to not answer any 
question or questions if you choose. This will not affect the relationship you have 
with the researcher. An audio device will digitally record the interviews and if you 
do not feel comfortable being recorded, the researcher will respect your wish and use 
a field diary. 
Anonymity and confidentiality: Every effort will be made by the researcher to 
preserve your anonymity. Neither your name nor the name of your employer will be 
divulged in the dissertation and anything published resulting from this. Furthermore, 
interview transcripts and notes will be kept confidential and will only be seen by the 
researcher and his supervisor. 
Risks: The risks of this study are minimal. These risks are similar to those you 
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experience when disclosing work-related information to others. You may decline to 
answer any or all questions and you may terminate your involvement at any time if 
you so choose. 
Benefits: There will be no direct benefit to you for your participation in this study. 
However, we hope that the information obtained from this study may inform policy 
makers, trade unions and other relevant institutions about alternatives that exist 
regarding the payment system. Furthermore, the information generated affords 
workers a chance to influence the future of the payment system within the clothing 
industry. 
Person to contact: Should you have any questions about the research or any related 
matters, please contact my supervisor, Dr Shane Godfrey: Ph: 021 650 3504. E-mail: 
shane.godfrey@uct.ac.za. You can also contact me on mobile: 072 797 9559. Email: 
wesley.maraire@gmail.com. 
Consent: By signing this consent form, I confirm that I have read and understood the 
information within it and have had the opportunity to ask questions. I understand that 
my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without 
giving a reason and without cost. I voluntarily agree to take part in this study. 
Signature _______________ 
Date ___________________ 
If you have concerns about the research, its risks and benefits or about your 
rights as a research participant in this study, you may contact the Law Faculty 
Research Ethics Committee Administrator, Mrs Lamize Viljoen, at 021 650 3080 or 
at lamize.viljoen@uct.ac.za. Alternatively, you may write to the Law Faculty 
Research Ethics Committee Administrator, Room 6.28 Kramer Law Building, 
Law Faculty, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701. 
